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ABSTRACT
AN EVALUATION OF RISK PRIORITY NUMBERS IN 
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS APPLIED TO THE 
PREDICTION OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS
Anthony W. Dean 
Old Dominion University, 2003 
Director: Dr. Andres Sousa-Poza
Complex systems such as military aircraft and naval ships are difficult to cost effectively 
maintain. Frequently, large-scale maintenance of complex systems (i.e., a naval vessel) is 
based on the reduction of the system to its base subcomponents and the use of 
manufacturer-suggested, time-directed, preventative maintenance, which is augmented 
during the systems lifecycle with predictive maintenance which assesses the system’s ability 
to perform its mission objectives. While preventative maintenance under certain 
conditions can increase reliability, preventative maintenance systems are often costly, 
increase down time, and allow for maintenance-induced failures, which may decrease the 
reliability of the system (Ebeling, 1997).
This maintenance scheme ignores the complexity of the system it tries to maintain. By 
combining the base components or subsystems into a larger system, and introducing 
human interaction with the system, the complexity of the system creates a unique entity 
that cannot be completely understood by basing predictability of the system to perform 
tasks on the reduction of the system to its subcomponents.
This study adds to the scholarly literature by developing a model, based on the traditional 
failure modes and effects analysis commonly used for research and development projects, 
to capture the effects of the human interaction with the system. Based on the ability of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
personnel assigned to operate and maintain the system, the severity of the system failure 
on the impact on the metasystems ability to perform its mission and the likelihood of the 
event of the failure to occur.
Findings of the research indicate that the human interaction with the system, in as far as 
the ability of the personnel to repair and maintain the system, is a vital component in the 
ability to predict likelihood of the system failure and the prioritization of the risk of system 
failure, may be adequately captured for analysis through use of expert opinion elicitation. 
The use of the expert’s opinions may provide additional robustness to the modeling and 
analysis of system behavior in the event that failure occurs.
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C H A P T E R  I 
INTRODUCTION  
Complex Systems
Complex systems such as military aircraft and naval ships are difficult to cost effectively 
maintain (Economic Report o f the President, 2002, US Office of Management and Budget, 
2002). One common approach o f maintaining these types o f complex systems has always 
been time-directed or preventative maintenance systems. While preventative maintenance 
under certain conditions can increase reliability, preventative maintenance systems are often 
costly, increase down time, and allow for maintenance-induced failures, which may decrease 
the reliability of the system (Ebeling, 1997). In complex systems like naval ships, where the 
mission completion is o f the utmost importance, compelling factors, such as time, cost and 
litde or no room for failure, are sufficient reasons to move toward an effective, knowledge 
information-based, reliability system.
Many problems are complex, and therefore few are predictable. In this sense, complexity is a 
question of degree, and specifically the degree of our ignorance (Biggiero, 2001). To view a 
system as complex, the degree o f complexity of the system is based on the quantity of 
information that is known about that system. The number of elements that make up a system 
and the large number o f interactions among those elements contribute to the existence of 
complexity. Given that complex systems have the common characteristic of structure
Thejournal model used in this dissertation is the TLngineermg Management Journal
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(Biggiero, 2001; Flood and Carson, 1993;), often the researcher will use that characteristic to 
develop a model o f the system.
Vemuri (in Flood and Carson, 1993) alludes to the following four precepts, three o f which 
must be considered based on the measurement, data, theory, law sequence. The fourth 
precept relates to the criterion that characterizes metasystems:
1. Complex situations are often partly or wholly unobservable, that is measurement is 
noisy or unachievable (e.g. any attempt may destroy the integrity of the system).
2. It is difficult to establish laws from theory in complex situations as there is often 
not enough data or the data is unreliable so that only probabilistic laws may be 
achievable.
3. Complex situations are often soft and incorporate value systems that are abundant, 
different, and extremely difficult to observe or measure. They may at best be 
represented using nominal and interval scales.
4. Complex situations are “open” and thus evolve over time.
Given Vemuri’s assessment of complexity, models of complex systems can only yield an 
approximation o f the systems’ behavior.
Biggiero (2001) has stated that “ .. .“complex” is an object which cannot be predictable because 
of logical impossibility or because its predictability would require a computational power far 
beyond any physical feasibility, now and forever.” In attempting to model the complex 
system, “we are seeking to provide a descriptive and explanatory account that provides the 
simplest, least complex way of accommodating the data that experience (experimentation and 
observation) has put at our disposal (Reseller, 1998).”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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One object o f modeling is to transform unclear, poorly articulated perceptions of a system into 
visible well-defined models useful for many purposes. Models are substitutes for reality, but 
should be descriptive enough for system elements under consideration to be useful. Principal 
uses o f models have always been to pose “policy” questions to the model and from the results 
obtained leam how to cope with that subset o f the real world being modeled (Sage, 1977).
Three essential steps in constructing a model are:
•  determine the problem definition value system and system synthesis elements 
most relevant to a particular problem
• determine the structural relationship among these elements
• determine parametric coefficients within the determined structure (Sage, 1977). 
“The crudest approximation, if it provides hints for the solution o f a broad range of problems, 
has every advantage over the most elegant mathematical law which asserts nothing of interest.” 
— Brewster Ghiselin (in Petrinovich and McGaugh, 1976). Models function as recursive 
generators o f predictions about the system. A model is necessarily simpler than the 
environment it represents, which allows it to run faster than the processes in the environment 
(i.e. anticipate the actions). This allows the system to compensate perturbations before they 
have the opportunity to damage the system (Heylighen, et al, 1995).
Statement of Problem
The approach to model development places an emphasis on the formal reasoning and 
representation o f the system to be studied. The model is formed from the perspective o f the 
individual and the individuals’ basic epistemological stance as a basis for the selection criteria. 
“According to the “modeling view” o f knowledge acquisition proposed by Clancy, the 
modeling activity must establish a correspondence between a knowledge base and two separate
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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subsystems: the agent’s behavior (i.e. the problem solving expertise) and its own environment 
(the problem domain)” (Guarino, 2000). The existing knowledge (base knowledge) forms a 
framework for the conceptual units by mapping their assumed interrelationships to allow for a 
more robust study of the system’s functionality.
Frequently, large-scale maintenance o f complex systems (i.e., a naval vessel) is based on the 
reduction of the system to its base subcomponents and the use of manufacturer-suggested, 
time-directed, preventative maintenance, which is augmented during the system’s lifecycle with 
predictive maintenance which assesses the system’s ability to perform its mission objectives. 
This maintenance scheme ignores the complexity o f the system it is trying to maintain. By 
combining the base components or subsystems into a larger system, and introducing human 
interaction with the system, the complexity o f the system creates a unique entity that cannot be 
completely understood by basing predictability of the system to perform tasks on the 
reduction of the system to its subcomponents.
Purpose of the Study
This research addresses whether a methodology can be developed that establishes a 
relationship between the knowledge base tightly held by the system experts, the data captured 
in the maintenance history of the complex system, and the behavior o f the system. The 
relationship can then be explored as a means to predict failure of the complex system to 
complete its tasks or missions, thus minimizing system down time for assessment and 
unnecessary maintenance.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Overview of the D issertation
In order to explore the feasibility of such a methodology to model complex systems, the 
dissertation will review the salient literature (Chapter 2) that comprises the bodies of 
knowledge reflective o f the subject matter, specifically: knowledge management, systems 
modeling and expert elicitation techniques. From the literature we will attempt to derive the 
need for the methodology in Chapter 3 by showing the ‘gap’ in the body o f existing knowledge 
that the research is trying to bridge. In Chapter 4 a conceptual model is developed and a plan 
o f research is described to provide an overview o f how an existing method of system behavior 
modeling -  failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) -  may be modified to provide a more 
holistic view o f legacy system behavior through the use o f expert knowledge. The 
methodology presented allows for a transfer o f tacit knowledge into an explicit form to make 
predictions regarding the system behavior. Results from the application of the conceptual 
methodology are presented (Chapter 5) and discussed (Chapter 6) providing suggestions 
(Chapter 7) for further research.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6
C H A P T E R  I I
LITERA TU RE REVIEW
Overview
For tbis research, the significant bodies o f knowledge permeate systems management, 
knowledge management and systems modeling. This research effort integrates these to 



















Figure 1 Funneled Representation to Gap in the Literature.
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Figure 1 takes the perspective o f the literature to be a wide funnel o f knowledge that can be 
gradually narrowed until we reach that ‘gap’ in the body o f knowledge where the research 
attempts to explain the gap through the development of a methodology. By development of 
the methodology, the gap is then closed, thus contributing to the broadening of the body of 
knowledge. This chapter will present the literature to promote the foundation for the 
methodology presented in the next chapter.
Systems Modeling
According to Sage (1997), a major objective in the management o f such a system is to obtain 
information necessary to organize and direct individual programs associated with the 
production o f products and services. He further states that this information can only be 
obtained through an appropriate program of systematic measurements and the development 
o f appropriate models for use in processing this information. In effect, to appropriately 
manage a large complex system, it is necessary to develop a decision support system to aid in 
the decision making process.
As with all decision support systems, the “twin engines” are data and models. Models provide 
the means for the conversion o f data into actionable information. In fact, the model pinpoints 
the actual data needs. By the same token, the model itself is constrained by the available data 
(Mohan and Holstein, 1999). Model development is further compounded if the system under 
observation is complex. The rendering of this information into useful and meaningful data 
requires the development of an appropriate model. In general, models -  simplification of “real 
world” processes by making assumptions concerning the system’s true state o f nature — have 
uncertainties due to incomplete knowledge. These uncertainties arise when the particular value 
or population o f values of concern cannot be presented with complete confidence because of 
A lack o f understanding or limitation o f knowledge (Haimes, 1998). This usually tends to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
cause a dilemma for managers trying to make decisions, due to lack o f supportive measures 
available that accurately model system behavior due to the complexity o f the system. 
Managers are then left to rely on the knowledge of the “system experts” who routinely work 
with the system and base their judgments solely on their advice.
The decision support system must include a flexible base methodology to allow deployment 
across various system classes. The conflict of viewpoints involved in producing the precise 
form of the methodology to be deployed is in itself problematic (Flood and Carson, 1993), as 
there are a vast number o f stakeholders with individual needs that must be addressed. While 
basic similarities will exist across comparable systems, the variations o f equipment within 
specific system classes and varying skill level o f the system operators in maintaining and 
operating the system(s) give pause to deployment o f a single knowledge-based decision model. 
The model must have flexibility for deployment across the various platforms. Consequently, 
the methodology o f the system design must also be flexible so that implementation o f the 
system is consistent across the platforms, but still is specific for the individual system class. 
This leads to the differentiation o f the various types of system methodologies that may be used 
for the development o f the decision support system that is the ultimate goal o f this research 
endeavor.
Assumptions o f Com plex System Principles
As previously stated, the proposed research model addresses the management o f a complex 
maintenance system. With the idea of a “complex” system in mind, it becomes important to 
clarify the notion o f what constitutes a complex system. While various methodologies exist for 
the development o f system-based initiatives, each methodology must adhere to a basic 
underlying group o f principles to ensure that an effective study and an understanding of the 
system, in its current state, is achieved. The specific approaches may differ but the underlying
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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'logic' is a common thread running through each o f the methodologies (Keating, 2000). The 
following four system tenets amalgamate the concept o f complex system analysis.
•  Simple vs. Complex Systems
o Characteristics of a complex systems (Jackson in Keating et al, 2002)
■ Large number o f variables or elements
■ Rich interactions among elements
■ Difficulty in identification o f attributes and emergent properties
■ Loosely organized (structured) interaction among elements
■ Probabilistic, as opposed to deterministic, behavior in the system
■ System evolution and emergence over time
" Purposeful pursuit of multiple goals by system entities or subsystems 
(pluralistic)
■ Possibility o f behavioral influence or intervention in the system
■ Largely open to the transport of energy, information, or resources
from /to across the system boundary to the environment
o  Characteristics o f a simple system
■ Small number o f variables or elements
" Poor interactions between elements
■ Ease of identification o f attributes
■ Deterministic behavior in the system
9 System does not evolve over time
* System is not effected by behavioral influences
■ Largely closed to the transport of energy, information, or resources
from /to across the system boundary to the environment
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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• Self-Organization. Self-organization holds that most of the structural and 
behavioral properties o f a system emerge through interaction o f the system 
elements (Clemson, 1984). Therefore, the actual design o f a system can only be 
partially specified in advance of system operation. From the systems perspective, 
this explains why the most thoughtful and carefully designed systems have 
unintended consequences. In essence, system behavior and informal structure 
emerge only through system operation, regardless o f the detailed design efforts 
conducted prior to system deployment.
Effective design of complex systems ensures that only the essential constraints are imposed on 
the operation o f the system. In systems theory this concept is known as minimum critical 
specification (Chems). Over-specification o f system requirements is: (1) wasteful of scarce 
resources necessary to monitor and control system performance, (2) reduces system autonomy 
which in turn restricts the agility and responsiveness of the system to compensate for 
environmental shifts, and (3) fails to permit subsystem elements to self-organige based on their 
contextual knowledge, understanding and proximity to the operating environment. Therefore, 
self-organisation suggests that system solutions should specify only the minimal requirements 
necessary to achieve system objectives. (Keating 2000)
•  System Darkness. This concept suggests that the complex system when viewed 
from any vantage point will not clearly present itself in its entirety. The complex 
system and any representation of the complex system can only be described by 
what is known, observed or suspected. Unknown, unobserved, unrepresentative, 
and emergent characteristics will be present and not known to the systems 
architect.
• Complementarity. The principle of complementarity suggests "Any two different 
perspectives (or models) about a system will reveal truths about that system that 
are neither entirely independent nor entirely compatible" (Clemson, 1984). Each 
system perspective is correct from a particular vantage point of the system. In
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
addition, each system perspective may also be considered, to some degree, 
incorrect from an alternate system vantage point The important argument is that 
there are multiple system vantage points, each adding to a more holistic impression 
of the system. Shifts in vantage points, environmental conditions, or knowledge 
will influence perspectives of a system. It is naive to consider there is only one 
system perspective that is "correct". Therefore, it is a mistake to conduct inquiry as 
to which system perspective is 'right'. Assumption o f a ‘right' system encourages 
advocacy and competition instead of dialog and collaboration. (Keating, 2000)
Additionally, a system study must also address the needs o f the individuals) who express 
interest or concern for the performance of the system to meet a desired outcome or 
functionality o f the system under study. To accomplish this task, a set o f criteria needs to be 
established to determine whether the system architect has developed a level of competency in 
understanding the system under study, and has determined an effective method o f addressing 
the concerns o f the desired outcomes of the system. The use of the developed criteria can then 
be used to evaluate the study (design, approach, accomplishment, effectiveness, strengths, 
weaknesses, etc.).
According to Jenkins (in Flood and Carson, 1993), in order to properly frame the problem 
context, the systems architect must be able to answer the following questions. How did the 
problem arise? Who are the people that believe it to be a problem? Who made the decision to 
implement a planning decision and what is the chain of argument leading to making a 
decision? Is the problem the right one and is the solution important? While these statements 
are part of the first phase of the Jenkins model, they remain true and pertinent in all attempts
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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at the study o f any system, simple or complex. These questions should lead the systems
architect to the following statements and conclusions to begin his study o f the system.
•  What are the objectives of the system as defined by the entity identifying the problem? 
How are these objectives being expressed?
• Development o f critical system issues (Relevant Circumstances)
o  What are the primary objectives o f the stakeholders that the system analysis is 
attempting to resolve?
•  Assumptions and constraints for system and study (Rationality)
o What assumptions must the systems architect make to begin his analysis? Are
there any constraints (time, budget, data) that the systems architect must work 
within?
• System problem statement
o A concise, descriptive statement o f the problem; developed to be a 
representation o f the best ‘current’ framing o f the problematic situation.
The biggest problem that a systems architect faces is in the selection o f the methodology he 
will use to analyze the system. In order to effectively select the methodology, he must have a 
clear picture o f the system and how it functions in order to select the methodology(ies) that 
best fit the situation at hand. The systems architect should begin by addressing the what 
(system), how (sub-systems) and why (the wider-system or system environment) o f the 
problem context (Checkland, 1999). The problem context developed is meant to give the 
systems architect a means to clearly identify the system that is to be studied. That is to say that 
the problem context should give the systems architect the ability to identify the system whose 
output/outcomes are the ones perceived to be the problem. He accomplishes this by 
performing the following tasks:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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•  Define the System. What is the system to be studied? Is it the correct system? From 
what perspective is the system to be viewed? What components make up the system?
•  Bounding the System. What are the system boundaries? While the initial boundaries 
may be arbitrary, the systems analyst must make reasonable assumptions as to what 
those boundaries should be.
•  System representation. How is the system to be represented? How are the systems 
components (subsystems) interactions presented to show the relations of the system 
with its environment, the relations within the system among the subsystems, and its 
inputs and outputs of the system?
•  System output/outcome (Actual vs. Ideal). W hat/how is the system currently 
functioning vs. how would the system stakeholders like for the system to function. 
Requires the architect to establish the needs of the stakeholders and the capabilities of 
the current system.
•  System expectations. What are the stakeholders’ expectations for the system? How do 
they envision the system to function?
• System measure o f performance. How is the system’s (under study) performance 
measured? Is the measurement to be quantitative or qualitative? Who is measuring the 
system performance?
Another perspective on modeling system behavior worth looking at was developed by Gibson.
Gibson’s methodology (Gibson, 1991) consists o f six major “steps”
• Determine system goals
•  Establish Alternative ranking criteria
•  Develop alternative systems solutions
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
•  Screen and rank alternatives
•  Iterate
•  Action and deployment
While a stepwise systems analysis is not appropriate in most cases, the spirit of Gibson is that 
these “steps” should serve as a guide to developing a complete and useful analysis.
In the first step o f Gibson’s methodology, goal development, Gibson recommends the 
following seven steps:
• Generalize the question — Here, the systems analyst ileaves enough room to reframe 
the problem after knowledge is gained through the iterative process.
•  Develop a descriptive scenario — this is the development o f the system view. It 
assumes that the same view is held by all and aid in the representation o f the system
• Develop a normative scenario — this establishes a minimum set of constraints by 
questioning whether constraints are necessary
•  Axiological component — Because the explicit cannot exist at a tacit level, a 
developed solution in a particular context may not be transferable to a different 
group with a different view o f the problem due to differing values and beliefs.
• Objectives tree — a graphical display o f the goals of the system. It is used to critique 
the organizational hierarchy o f the goals. Tree branches are additive to indicate how 
higher-level goals may be achieved through the support provided by accomplishing 
objectives.
• Validate — Through each step o f the goal development process, the system analyst 
tries to validate and consolidate his findings. He is ultimately asking, “Is the problem 
properly framed?”
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• Iterate — go through the process again.
It is interesting to note that Gibson’s first step in accomplishing system analysis attempts to 
mirror the ideology that a problem context should be developed. However, this is problematic 
with the idea put forth in this paper, that the problem context should determine the 
methodology to be used for the system analysis. As stated earlier, a complex system has 
emergent properties that are not clearly defined due the concept o f “system darkness”. 
Gibson’s approach is rather prescriptive, lacking flexibility in this process with the assumption 
that all stakeholders will share the same systems view. This prevents the development o f a 
thorough understanding of the system, as when the system is viewed from multiple 
perspectives and as those perspectives merge, there is a better understanding of the problem 
situation and, therefore, the system problem becomes more contextually bounded by those 
views.
Gibson’s next step in performing a systems analysis is to provide an alternative ranking criteria 
based on an index o f performance. Accordingly Gibson has provided his ‘ideal’ characteristics 
of that index:






The unanswered question relating to Gibson’s index of performance characteristics is to what 
purpose? The use o f these performance metrics is too limiting to achieve the intent of the
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ranking of alternatives. They lack a means to identify a systematic way of measuring the 
suitability for the alternatives -  a standard. The index of performance, as put forth by Gibson, 
provides minimal structure for the decision process and is biased to the value and belief system 
of the stakeholders and the systems analyst
In developing the alternative system solutions, Gibson provides little structure for the process. 
Instead of the structured approach, as with his stepwise methodology, he encourages the 
systems architect to be creative. The basis for this unstructured approach is apparent in the 
built in control the stepwise methodology purports, that the ranking, based on the 
performance indices will ‘screen’ unlikely or unviable alternatives.
The process o f iteration, in the Gibson methodology, provides focus for the system analysis. 
It allows for ‘fine tuning’ of the analysis process. Models function as recursive generators of 
predictions about the system. A model is necessarily simpler than the environment that it 
represents, and this allows for it to run faster than, i.e. anticipate the actions, the processes in 
the environment. This allows the system to compensate perturbations before they have the 
opportunity to damage the system (Heylighen, et al, 1995). In much the same way, Gibson’s 
process of iteration allows for the analyst to reduce the alternatives to a manageable number 
with the added benefit of the ‘buy-in’ o f those interested parties involved with the process.
The final step in Gibson’s methodology is the action and deployment of the solution(s).
Gibson makes a great contribution the body o f system methodologies. He has provided a 
structured approach that organizes the problem, recognizes the problem’s context, has 
consideration for the values and beliefs (axiological component) o f the interested parties, is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
iterative, and takes an intelligent approach to problem solving. However, caution should be 
used in the application o f this methodology, as with others, the system, the context of the 
problem, and the environment that houses both should determine the use o f a particular 
methodology. No one methodology is better than any other when it comes to system analysis. 
It is a matter of “fit” between the contextually rich interrelationships o f the system, the 
problem context and the methodology. A big mistake that systems architects are prone to 
make is to follow a stepwise progression through a particular methodology because they are 
comfortable with it. The system and problem context must “choose” the methodology, not 
the other way around.
•  Methodology selection. What is the methodology(ies) that best fit the situation? How 
was that determined and by who?
•  Application o f the methodology. Was the methodology(ies) selected properly applied 
in the analysis o f the system?
•  Development o f a systems model. The model should be an abstract o f the system 
under study. To what level o f detail was the model developed?
• Goodness o f Fit. By “goodness of fit” we try to identify the rich contextual 
relationships between the methodology used by the systems architect to study the 
system and the problems identified by the problem context. This attempt should be 
satisfying. Does the methodology used fit the problem and the system as developed in 
the problem context and the system model?
• Representation effectiveness. Does the model effectively and efficiently depict the 
system and the complex interrelationships o f the system (interaction of system with its 
environment, interaction o f the subsystems)? Does the model identify gaps in our 
knowledge o f the system?
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•  Limitations and assumptions for system representation. What are the assumptions and 
limitations o f the model? What does/does not the model express?
Complex System M odel Developm ent
Each individual’s ontological view of the world tends to bias the perspective from which they 
would observe the system. The level from which the observer views the system (Checkland, 
1999) lays the foundation from which the researcher, as an observer, bases his assumptions. 
The researcher’s viewpoint is predisposed due to the worldview he posses. While basic truths 
may exist in the system as a whole, the viewpoint o f the observer is based on knowledge that 
the observer has gained throughout his entire existence. He has developed a knowledge basis 
from which he has tried to adapt to the given situation, which has resulted in the formation o f 
his viewpoint of the situation. That is to say that the system exists on many levels, but the 
view from which it is to be observed, and the model developed, is dependent solely on the 
observer.
This implies that the oversimplification o f a model results from a lack o f knowledge on the 
part o f the observer. From a systems analysis viewpoint, simplification is not necessarily a bad 
thing.
I t clearly makes eminent sense to move onwards from the simplest (least complex) available solution to 
introduce further complexities when and as — but only when and as -  they are forced upon us. Simpler 
(more systematicj answers are easily more codified, taught, learned, used, investigated, and so on. The 
regulative principles o f convenience and economy in learning and inquiiy suffice to provide a rational 
basisfor systematicity-preference. Ourpreference fo r simplicity, uniformity, and systematicity in general, 
is now not a matter of a substantive theory regarding the nature of the world, but one of a search 
strategy — o f cognitive methodology. In sum we opt fo r simplicity (and systematicity in general) in 
inquiry not because it is truth-indicative, but because tekologically more fffective in conducing to the 
efficient realisation o f the goals o f inquiry. We look fo r the dropped coin in the lightest spots nearby, 
not because this is -  in the circumstances -  the most probable location but because it represents the 
most sensible strategy of search: i f  it is not there, then wejust cannot find  it at all (Rescher, 1998)
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In general, the simple model is a manifestation o f what the researcher presumes to know, his 
base approximation o f the system. While this concept at first seems a little clouded, an 
interpretation o f this concept is as follows: From the perspective that the system is viewed 
(ontologicafly), a model is developed. There must be a base level of knowledge about the 
system to effectively engage in a systems-based initiative, which results in the development of 
the initial framework o f the interrelations o f the system’s conceptual units (Checkland, 1999). 
Through trial and error, the researcher gradually adjusts the model (problem solving expertise), 
with each iteration, in an attempt to achieve a bridging of the gap between the ideal outcomes 
of the system and the actual outcomes o f the system (gap — the problem domain). With each 
iteration, knowledge is gained (epistemological part) as to the assumptions the researcher had 
to make as he adjusted the model. The iterations themselves revealed to the researcher as to 
whether his initial assumptions of the unit’s interrelations were true or false. Progressing 
through the iterative process, the researcher is learning about the system and gaining 
knowledge that did not previously exist. As the researcher gains knowledge during this 
process, it will become evident to the researcher that the model must then be reoriented to 
reflect the new knowledge. The result is a more mature level of systems knowledge compared 
to the base knowledge the researcher began with. This mature knowledge will lead to a greater 
understanding of the actual system under study and more effective insight/resolution to the 
disparity of the ideal and actual system outcomes (gap closure).
Assuming that the model of the system is a dynamic model, based on an iterative modeling 
process, and given the ontological and epistemological view of a researcher attempting to 
model a system for study, the following four points (as derived from the literature) are 
proposed as a counter argument to the effects o f oversimplification o f a model.
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Point 1. There is no perfect true ” model of any system. For a given system several models may exist
from an ontologically materialistic view) that may be adequate for solving the problem 
situation faced by the researcher.
Any systems model developed is based solely on the viewpoint of the observer (Checkland, 
1999). The observer’s base knowledge o f the system establishes the functional utility for the 
framework o f the system component relations in achieving systems goals (outcomes). As in 
the ‘black box’ theory, numerous independent observers who are at consensus with the inputs 
view the system and outputs o f the system, yet are in disagreement about the transformation 
processes that occur within the system. As the researcher gains knowledge of the diverse 
communications and actions of the units that comprise the system, an approximation o f the 
true nature o f the system is developed, but is only an approximation. With multiple observers, 
many diverse approximations will be developed; most will be quite different based only the 
observers ontological view.
Point 2. Acceptance o f the knowledge gained by the researcher will tend to be rejected i f  it is
inconsistent with the bulk of knowledge possessed (base knowledge) prior to system study.
If an individuals) or group(s) evaluates a system model modified by a researcher after multiple 
iterations, without the individual(s) or group(s) having the maturity in knowledge the 
researcher has gained through the iterative process, a dysfunctional dynamic will exist between 
the researcher and that individual/group (Gibson, 1991). The individual/group lacks the 
ability to effectively evaluate the model because it does not comprehend the system at the 
same knowledge level the researcher is presenting in the “iterative” based model. In order for 
the model to become acceptable, the individual/group must be brought up to the knowledge
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level of the researcher through other means, else the knowledge gained by the researcher will 
be lost on the individual/group expressing interest in the system of study.
Point 3. A  systems based methodology is chosen to f i t  the ontological and epistemological view of the
researchers “best f i t” model. How the researcher views the system is fundamental in 
determining his approach to “problem solving”.
The model is only a conceptual representation o f the researcher’s approximation of the system. 
Does the model effectively and efficiendy depict the system and the complex interrelationships 
of the system (interaction of system with its environment, interaction of the subsystems)? 
Does the model identify gaps in our knowledge o f the system? While these questions come to 
mind when thinking about the model, the methodology must fit the problem context 
(Guarino, 1995). In relation to the model, problem context is the perception of the researcher 
of the gap between the ideal outcomes o f the system and the actual outcomes o f the system. 
Again, the context (like the model developed) is a function o f the ontological view and base 
knowledge o f the researcher.
Point 4. Models are not static representations of the system being studied. Models will change as
knowledge is gained.
The model is an entity and representation o f the system under study. It is not the system itself. 
The framework (base knowledge) and conceptual units o f the system created by the researcher 
are an attempt to examine and explain system behavior (Checkland, 1999). As the iterations of 
the study progress, further knowledge is gained and the initial framework and conceptual units 
must be altered to reflect this (Gibson, 1991).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
22
It is most important to note that the results o f a systems study are highly subjective and duly 
apt to interpretation to those individuals who read them. A system study is intended for the 
use o f the individuals) (or stakeholders) who perceive a problem with the actual outcomes of 
the system as it was currently operating based on their individual perspective. The individual is 
naturally biased in his/her perspective based on his/her own ontological stance. Even in the 
reading of the study, the interpretations and use o f the presented work is highly subjective and 
innately dependent on the ontological and epistemological views o f the reader (Cocchiarella,
1996). As stated previously, acceptance will be based on knowledge individuals already posses.
Morgan introduced five approaches to lessen a similar paradox in the determination of 
research dilemmas faced in management science (in Gill and Johnson, 1991). While the 
underlying concepts are true in systems science, the concepts have modified here to more 
appropriately correspond with systems science. The researcher should ask the following 
questions about his analysis.
1. What was the intended use o f the body o f work produced by the researcher? Is the 
work relevant to the problem?
2. What were the objectives o f the stakeholders? Were these objectives addressed in 
the study?
3. What was the researcher trying to gain from the study o f the system? Did the study 
produce a work that is usable by others to obtain their goals?
4. Were the limitations, assumptions, and judgments made by the researcher 
consistent with the perspectives o f the stakeholders?
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5. Did the researcher “look outside the box” of a particular methodology to 
determine the best approach to the situation?
By attempting to keep those questions mindful, the researcher will address the concerns o f the 
interpretation and use of his work when applied to the system studied.
Reductionism vs. Holism
The concepts of modeling and complex systems are then combined to form the arguments for 
reductionism and holism as presented in figure 1. Systems, Cybernetics, and Complexity all 
share an orientation towards the study o f organization of phenomena in taking a “big picture” 
perspective (Kuhn, 2002). From a holistic view, the system is observed in its entirety to study 
‘complexes o f information and meaning’ such as patterns, configurations, processes, and types. 
From a reductionistic view, an attempt is made to decompose complex activities and localize 
the components within the complex system to provide a foundation for dynamical analysis 
(Bechtel, 2001). These diametrically opposed views have been characterized (Ragin, 1989; 
Verschuren, 2001) as the (holistic) case study as ‘case-oriented’, in contrast to a (reductionistic) 
‘variable-oriented’ approach. Often in research we can also describe them, respectively, as 
qualitative and quantitative. Both theoretical frameworks share a base in scientifically derived 
knowledge, an interest in understanding non-living (artificial/machine) and ‘living systems’, 
and a belief that to more properly understand phenomena, a larger, more inclusive view is 
necessary. Van Gelder (in Bechtel, 2001), for example, identifies homuncularity, the idea that 
one can analyz'e systems into components, as allied with such notions as representation, 
computation, and sequential and cyclic operation, all o f which he views as incompatible with 
and supplanted by a dynamical approach. Efforts to decompose and localize processes are 
often ridiculed [by holist] as reductionistic and conceived o f as unable to explain the operation
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of complex systems. Recognizing that phenomena can be more properly understood as parts 
of systems also implies that the observer has the ability to delineate with some security the 
proper systems and/or components o f systems implicated when investigating any specific 
phenomena (Kuhn, 2002).
As engineers, scientist and researchers, decomposition of a complex system into its subsystems 
and elements for model development is an attempt to isolate variables that uniquely determine 
the state of the complex system under study. The reductionist has to make the assumption 
that the holistic view o f the system that he has chosen to decompose is accurate and that the 
variables that uniquely determine its state are known. In principle, the application o f such a 
theory to real problems requires the simultaneous measurement o f all these variables. This is 
rarely feasible in practice, where often we will not even know what the important variables are. 
All that we may be able to achieve is to make a sequence o f repeated measurements o f one or 
more observables. The relationship between such observations and the state of the system is 
often uncertain. It is therefore unclear how much information about the behavior o f the 
system we can deduce from such measurements (Stark, 2000).
In the true metaphysical application o f reductionism, as characterixed in the philosophical 
literature, it may in fact be difficult to express the operation of a complex system once it is 
decomposed into its components, but from the ontological perspective o f a systems engineer 
there is logic in the decomposition of a large complex system. Reduction of a system into its 
base parts allows the researcher to achieve two goals, one being quantification the other being 
able to establish researcher independence (Verschuren, 2001).
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Quantification allows for the establishment o f a metric means for measurement. This 
measurement allows for comparison o f the results o f the research, as well as replication and 
control of what the researcher has accomplished. Additionally, quantification allows for the 
counting of observation units having certain characteristics thus allowing for multi-variate data 
analysis. Finally, the belief that quantitative research is more valid than qualitative research, 
due to its subjectivity, lends to the widespread use o f quantitative research (Verschuren, 2001).
Moreover, a reductionistic type of data gathering may help achieve researcher-independent
results (Verschuren, 2001). This would allow for systematic observation and quantitative
content analysis, rather than for participant observation and open-ended qualitative content
analysis. A final argument for reductionism is that the differentiation between research units
and observation units may act as a kind of cross-validation.
A s most hypotheses come into being inductively as an overall impression of the researcher, 
testing them in an inductive way ceteris paribus is weaker than doing this reductionistically.
For instance, imagine a researcher formulates the hypothesis that o f two groups the members 
within group 1 interact significantly more than those o f group 2. Then looking at all dyads in 
each group, counting the number and duration of interactions per dyad within a certain period 
and summating over all dyads and periods, fo r most people will be more convincing as a test of 
the hypothesis, than an overall impression of a researcher who observes these groups as wholes.
This confidence is based in large part on the fact that the researcher often has a number of 
ideas and implicit assumptions as to the object of research. By looking at its elementary parts 
(i.e., observation units) instead of at the object as a whole, a professional researcher will 
forget’ these assumptions and ideas for the simple reason that these do not directly regard the 
individual parts (Verschuren, 2001).
While reductionism on the surface appears to be a most valid means to approach to isolate the 
variables necessary to understand a complex system, there are some limitations to the 
reductionistic approach in building a model o f a complex system. There is a familiar idea that 
the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Petrinovich (1976) points to the major difficulty 
with reductionism stemming from two sources: (1) it distorts the structure of natural events, 
and (2) it embodies a misleading conception o f the meaning o f individual differences. The
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first point refers to the fact that to use techniques such as analysis o f variance one must select 
a range of stimulus values in some arbitrary fashion, must choose a dependent variable to 
measure that is arbitrary, and often limiting operational translation o f the conceptual variables 
in which the in which the experimenter is interested and must abstract the entire experimental 
operation out o f a complex o f variables in which the behavior is embedded.
By separating the variables controlling the behavior from the fabric from which they are 
embedded, the pattern o f correlations between variables as they exist in nature is destroyed. 
Context dependencies, interconnectedness, and functionality are lost. “Because a cause was 
taken to be sufficient for its effect, nothing was required to explain the effect other than the 
cause.” (close parenthesis here?) Consequently, the quest for causes was environment free. It 
employed what is now called ‘closed-system’ thinking’ (Ackhoff in Kuhn, 2001). In 
establishing the viability o f research surrounding the development o f the deconstruct 
subsystem model, acceptance of the principle o f determinism is required. This principle 
implies that general laws exist which allows for the complete predictability o f behavior if 
measurement is precise and if all relevant variables could be controlled. It also implies that the 
system had been deconstructed such that the subsystem under observation is no longer 
complex and completely understood.
Verschuren (2001) clarifies the second difficulty with reductionism, “In general not the sum of 
individual parts of a system makes up an equilibrium, but the integrated whole o f a system.” 
His statement alludes to the concept that without the holistic view, there is not a way to 
determine how perturbations to the deconstruct subsystem model will effect the behavior of 
the complex system. This suggests that the knowledge gained by isolating the subsystem for
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study may not have a significant use in understanding the complex system’s response (macro) 
to the stimulus introduced at the subsystem level (micro).
In order to reconcile the problem of not being fully able to predict the behavior o f a complex 
system through the development o f complete models with full predictive capability though 
either holistic or reductionistic reasoning, the following assertions are put forth:
1. While important to establish a base knowledge level when studying a complex 
system, system models do not represent the system but serve as an 
approximation o f the system and current knowledge base of the researcher.
2. Models o f complex systems require an iterative development process to allow 
for variability inherent in complex systems and modifications due to the 
researcher’s knowledge.
3. Statistical and other quantification methods, used in conjunction with 
reductionism to evaluate the behavior of the subsystem, may not yield the 
same results when applied at the system level.
4. Reductionism should be used in conjunction with holism to identify those 
variables in the system, which control “meaningful proportions” of the total 
variance in behavior of the complex system.
5. Predictions made from the use o f complex models will be probabilistic at best.
Knowledge Management
Whereas data is directly observable and measurable, knowledge is a statement about a 
hypothesis. The process o f knowledge management is a means to develop the specification of 
a meaningful likelihood function based on the notion o f probability (Singpurwalla, 2003) that 
is useful to others experiencing similar queries into the state o f the hypothesis at varying 
degrees. The combination of knowledge with related data creates information that may be used
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to support or reject the hypotheses that are generated. Von Hoffman (1999) defines
knowledge management as a formal process of 
figuring out what information a company has 
that could benefit others with in the company, 
then devising ways of making it easily available. 
As knowledge is an important strategic asset 
for organizations that leads to improved 
organizational performance, so it reasons that 
knowledge management must be concerned with many processes aimed at designing and 




Figure 2, Relation of Knowledge 
to Data and Information.
While this idea sounds simplistic at first, it is necessary to discuss the two distinct but very 
different dimensions o f knowledge that have a profound impact on the ability o f an 
organization to capture that knowledge and make it available — tad t and explicit knowledge 
(Polanyi, 1967). One dimension emphasizes the capability to help create, store, share, and use 
an organization’s explidtly documented knowledge. Explidt knowledge is very formal and 
systematic, it can be easily communicated and shared, in product spedfications, in sdentific 
formula or a computer program (Nonaka, 1991). As such, sdence and engineering are forms 
o f organized [explidt] knowledge — a collection of hypotheses in some logical manner 
(Singpurwalla, 2003). Often explicit knowledge is readily available to all within the 
organization. The strategy for this dimension emphasizes codifying and storing knowledge. 
Typically, knowledge can be codified via information technology (Lee & Kim, 2001; Swan, 
Newell, and Robertson, 2000). Codified knowledge is more likely to be reused. The emphasis 
is on completely specified sets o f rules about what to do under every possible set of 
circumstances (Bohn, 1994). Then management o f explicit knowledge is similar to the modem
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library system, in that the organizations explicit knowledge is collected, stored and made 
readily available to those who need to access i t  The true need for knowledge management 
arises from the need for use of the second type o f knowledge that exists -tacit knowledge.
Tacit knowledge is highly personable and it is hard to formalize and communicate (Nonaka 
and Takeuchi, 1995). Michael Polanyi (1967) expresses the concept well: “We can know more 
than we can tell.” As such, tacit knowledge is deeply rooted in an individual’s commitment to 
a specific context — a craft or profession, a particular technology or product market, or specific 
activities of a work group or team. Tacit knowledge falls within the realm o f an individual’s 
holistic perspective as it relates to the cognitive dimension that the expert seemingly takes for 
granted, and therefore cannot easily articulate them. As per this dimension, the strategy uses 
dialogue through social networks including occupational groups and teams (Swan et aL, 2000). 
It helps share knowledge through person-to-person contacts (Hansen et al., 1999). This 
strategy attempts to acquire internal and opportunistic knowledge and share it informally 
(Jordan & Jones, 1997). The existence o f tacit knowledge for use in knowledge management 
however, gives the foundation for the development of explicit knowledge based on tacit 
knowledge: Knowledge can be obtained from experienced and skilled people.
In its purest context, knowledge management is much more than the generation o f a 
contextual database o f knowledge that is gathered by an organization and stored for later use. 
It involves the exploration of the four distinct patterns o f knowledge creation and exploits 
them enabling organization to further its objectives (Polanyi, 1967; Nonaka, 1991; Choi and 
Lee, 2002).




An individual shares tadt knowledge with another. For example, an apprentice leams form a 
master through observation, imitation and practice. Skills learned become part of the 
individual’s tadt knowledge base, becoming ‘socialized’ into the craft being learned. In such 
a fashion, it is a limited form of knowledge creation because as in the example the master 
and apprentice never gain insight into the craft knowledge. Because the knowledge never 




Because the knowledge is explicit, it can readily be disseminated through the organization. 
The knowledge can then be combined with other explidt or tadt knowledge creating new 
knowledge that the individual may use. While new knowledge may be created in this form, 
this combination does not really extend the organizations knowledge base.
Tacit to Explicit
(Externalization)
The process of articulation (converting tacit knowledge to explidt knowledge) allows for the 
sharing of tacit knowledge throughout the organization
Explicit to Tacit
(Internalization)
As a result of new knowledge, a better cross-section if individuals within the organization 
may begin to internalize explidt knowledge allowing them to broaden, extend and reffame 
their individual tadt knowledge.
Table 1, Knowledge Creation Patterns, adapted from Nonaka, 1991.
The problem for knowledge management then becomes how to articulate the tacit knowledge 
to a more useful explicit form for dissemination to the organization.
Expert Knowledge Elicitation
Since a great deal o f knowledge is tacit, one way to To model the system, the concept of 
reductionism is key to reducing the system to its base components. However, to understand 
the rich interactions of the system, to minimize the effects o f “system darkness” that is limiting 
the overall context in which the system is operating, understand the ability o f the system to 
compensate for the various perturbations resulting from the system subcomponents failures 
and determine the human capability to repair or realign the system to minimize their effects, a 
holistic perspective must also be deployed. One way to develop a holistic perspective is to 
capture the [tacit] knowledge held by various experts on the system and integrate that 
knowledge into the system model (Rush and Wallace, 1997; Baecher, 2002; Checkland, 1999; 
Gibson, 1991).
The key to any knowledge-based system is the integrity o f the process, which elicits and 
represents the human expertise on which the system is based (Rush and Wallace, 1997).
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Baecher (2002) defines the quantification o f expert opinion in the form of judgmental 
probabilities as expert elicitation. The process o f knowledge elicitation (Rush and Wallace,
1997) must define two essential items:
1. The core concepts or components o f the decision situation, and
2. The manner in which these components interact with each other.
The literature suggests that there are a variety of knowledge elicitation techniques that may be 
used for this purpose as detailed in table 2.
Technique Description Reference




Delphi Method Structured sharing for gaining group consensus; 
useful for assimilating knowledge/opinions
Linstone and 
Turnoff, 1975 












Organizes experts as nominal group functioning 




Protocol Analysis AKA Think Aloud, participants are taught to 
think aloud as they solve a problem, provides 
rich description of the individual’s analytical 
process
Newell and Simon, 
1972




Participant describes goals or outcomes. Works 
with an analyst to define the events evidence or 
scenarios that would support the desired 
outcome.
Cordingley, 1989
Table 2, Knowledge Elicitation Techniques, adapted from Medsker, et al (1995) and 
Hoffmann et al (1995).
Protocol Analysis (Newell and Simon, 1972 and Ericsson and Simon, 1984) and 
Reclassification/ Goal Decomposition (Cordingley, 1989) require each expert to work 
independently and closely with the researcher. There is evidence, however, that supports the
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use o f multiple experts to reduce the bias resulting from the beliefs o f an individual. Lock 
(1987) notes that consensus distribution formed by combining the qualified degrees o f beliefs 
by experts is shown to frequendy out perform individual experts in forecasting. Specific 
examples of consensus methods include brainstorming, nominal group technique, and the 
Delphi Method. Accordingly, Turban and Tan (1993) note the following benefits o f using 
multiple experts.
1. On the average, a group will make fewer mistakes than single experts
2. Several experts in the group can often reduce, or eliminate the need for a world class 
expert
3. The collective expertise o f multiple experts will often be broader and deeper than that 
of a single expert.
4. Often the simultaneous consideration of the experts’ thoughts will result in deeper 
insight into the problem at hand.
The group may serve to enhance individual commitment, help with resolving ambiguous and 
conflicting knowledge, and facilitate creativity along with watchfulness for errors.
The underlying theme of the literature suggest as supported by Baecher (2002) is that a 
successful process for eliciting expert judgment must include the following steps:
1. Decide on the general uncertainties o f the probabilities o f which need to be assessed.
2. Select a panel of experts displaying a balanced spectrum of expertise about the 
unidentified uncertainties.
3. Refine issues in discussions with the panel, and decide on the specific uncertainties the 
probabilities of which need to be assessed.
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4. Expose the experts to a short training program on concepts, objectives, and methods 
of elicitation judgmental probability, and on common errors that people make when 
trying to quantify probability.
5. Elicit the judgmental probabilities o f individual experts on issues pertinent to heir 
individual expertise
6. Allow the group o f experts to interact, supported by a facilitator, to explore 
hypotheses, points o f view, and quantified estimates o f probability, toward the goal of 
aggregating probabilities and resolving the breadth o f opinion.
7. Document the specific process used to elicit judgmental probabilities and 
communicate the results back to the panel of experts.
Structured Approach to System Behavior Analysis
In order to determine the general probabilities o f the system behaviors to be addressed, it also 
becomes apparent that there is a need to develop a structured approach to the elicitation of the 
knowledge. Again, the literature suggests a variety of methods that may be incorporated to 
focus the experts in a manner that will structure the process to provide the necessary focus 
while allowing the expert to view the system in a broad holistic manner. This provides a 
structure to the decomposition or reduction of the complex system for analysis of the 
anticipated or possible system perturbations that may occur. [Table 3]
In effect, a structured behavior analysis approach when applied to the system, supplies a 
framework for the representation o f the data rather than the data collection. This abstract 
framework (Cooke, 1994) assumes particular types of structures or components (e.g. Actions, 
functions, rules) as well as their relationships to one anther (e.g. hierarchical). While many of 
the techniques are highly graphic (e.g. time line analysis, fault trees, diagram drawing) they 
enable illustration and make more vivid relationships among the elements in the system
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(Miester, 1985) and the interaction o f the personnel in contact with the system. Another form 
o f structure that is also used is the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). Like the 
highly graphic techniques discussed, the FMEA establishes a hierarchical structure for the 
behavior of the system in response to failure o f subsystems and components. It is suggested in 
the literature (Cooke, 1994, McGraw and Harbison-Briggs, 1989) that use of these types of 
structural techniques may be used to handle multiple experts in that the relatedness estimates 
that are used as input can be aggregated over a number o f experts to generate a composite 




The analyst determines time critical 
sequences o f tasks using the informant's 
definition o f the temporal relationships 
of tasks.
McGraw and Harbison- 
Briggs, 1989 
Meister, 1986 




The analyst determines what errors might 
occur in the informant's domain and 
what the consequences o f such errors 
would be to the system
Henley and Kumamoto, 1981 
Kirwan and Rea, 1986 
Parry, 1986 
Rasmussen, et al, 1981
Fault Trees The analyst develops a fault tree that 
decomposes an undesired event into 
causal events and errors.
Green, 1983
Henley and Kumamoto, 1981 
Parry, 1986 
Veseley, et al, 1981
Information Flow 
Analysis
The analyst develops a flow chart o f the 
information and decisions required to 
carry out the system's functions. The 
informant reviews and corrects the
diagram.
Mancuso and Shaw, 1988 
Meister, 1989 
Stammers, et al, 1990
Diagram Drawing The analyst draws a diagram representing 
processes in or states o f the informant's 
domain. Possible formats include flow 
charts, activity charts, and system state\ 
action state diagrams
Fisher, et al, 1990
Hall, et al, 1994
Geiwitz, et a l , 1988 
Bainbridge, 1979
Table 3, Structured Approaches for System Behavior Analysis, 
adapted from Cooke, 1994.
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Summary
A summary o f the literature shows that there are various approaches to the development of 
models that can approximate the behavior o f a complex system. Various techniques were 
presented as methodologies for developing the complex system model. Each technique 
involves, to greater or lesser degrees, the concept o f the reduction of the system to its base 
components for simplification o f the model o f the system. The major theme in the literature 
was that, while these simple models approximate the complex system’s behavior, the model 
itself was not a true representation o f the complex system, but an approximation of the 
variables viewed from the observer’s ontological stance.
There appeared to be a gap in the literature in describing a methodology that allows for a 
holistic view o f the rich interaction of the complex system’s subsystems and components once 
the system is deconstructed in to its basic elements. There is documentation in the literature 
for the development o f “expert” systems models. The gap that forms the basis for this 
research is the lack o f a methodology that shows that the knowledge of the interactions of the 
system can be derived from the system experts tacit knowledge and incorporated into the 
complex system model for a legacy complex system to better aid in the predictability of that 
system’s propensity for failure.
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C H A P T E R  I I I 
CONCEPTUAL M ODEL
Introduction
This chapter completes the literature funnel by introducing the maintenance context that the 
conceptual model must address. The conceptual model then addresses how both a 
reductionistic perspective and a holistic perspective can be gained from the model put forth 
through the use of expert knowledge in the development of a modified FMEA at the systems 
level.
Maintenance
Deshpande and Modak (2003) define maintenance as ensuring that [a] physical asset continues 
to fulfill its intended function. These functions o f the assests and its desired standards of 
performance define the objectives o f maintenance with respect to any asset. Very few systems 
are designed to operate without maintenance o f any kind, and for the most part they must 
operate in environments where access is very difficult, or where replacement is more 
economical than maintenance (Lewis, 1994). Increasing complexity in design and high levels 
of automation has made detection o f failure and repair of equipment more difficult (Robinson, 
1987; Paz and Leigh, 1994; and Swanson, 2001). High levels o f capital intensity associated with 
many systems have placed greater pressure on the maintenance function to rapidly repair 
equipment and prevent failures from occurring (Collins and Hull, 1986; Swanson 2001).
There are three classes of maintenance schemes: corrective, preventive and predictive 
(Swanson, 2003; Yang, 2001). Corrective maintenance occurs after a system has failed and
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repair to the system is necessary. Preventative maintenance involves the replacement of parts, 
adjustments to the system or changes to the system to improve the reliability of the system and 
prevent failure by staving off the effects of system aging. Predictive maintenance requires the 
assessment o f the system by a system expert and unscheduled maintenance to prevent the 
possibility o f the failure based on unrevealed system problems.
While time-based and MTTF practices are based on a window of opportunity and on the 
likelihood o f a failure occurring during a specific time in the systems lifecycle in preventative 
maintenance (Lewis, 1994), predictive maintenance generally requires that technical experts 
evaluate the system in its entirety. Predictive maintenance is less costly than [corrective] 
emergency or preventive maintenance and results in less down time to perform adjustments, 
repair, and cleaning, when the established metric reaches a predetermined point, is scheduled 
with no disruption o f the operation (Westerkamp, in Maynard 2001).
Often referred to as condition-based maintenance (Yang, 2002), predictive maintenance is 
initiated in response to a specific equipment condition. However it is that assessment of the 
condition over time that requires an expert evaluation based on the expert’s experience with 
the equipment being maintained. In effect the experts are making reliability predictions of the 
system from a top down perspective o f the system based on similar experience with like 
systems w’hose reliability is known to the exerts, rather than from the base parts level. 
According to O ’Connor (1995) this type o f predictive schema is one that is likely to be attained 
only if there is human commitment to it.
The literature presented in Chapter 2 suggests that an expert knowledge based, predictive 
maintenance system is feasible. This type of maintenance schema may be applied to quantify 
the system operability over a given time period to determine the need for assessment of the
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system, based on the collective knowledge o f system experts, on the reliability of the system 
components and the ability of repair by the system’s technicians.
A methodology that establishes a relationship between the knowledge base tightly held by the 
system experts, the data captured in the maintenance history of the complex system, and the 
behavior of the system was not prevalent in the literature. By establishing the relationship, a 
better determination may be made for the need for assessment of the entire system by experts 
to reveal potential unforeseen failures. Potential advantages o f such a methodology are:
•  Cost savings -  Costs associated with the use o f technical experts shifted to general 
maintenance personnel
•  Reduction in failures -  identifies possible causes o f impending failures to warn of 
failure before it occurs
•  Mission availability — decreases the time necessary to take system out of service for 
unnecessary assessments
C onceptual Model
In studying the complex maintenance system, and development o f a model that approximates 
the system, the system must be decomposed to the basic failure sequences that are intended 
for study. However, this reduction in the system to its base components is not enough to 
understand the interactions o f the system with its environment, nor does it provide the 
necessary picture o f how the system and its human interface compensate to perturbations on 
the system. The systemic model must then include a component that addresses the hoEstic 
perspective o f the system.
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Reducitonistfc Sjstem Model I
Figure 3, Conceptual Model for Maintenance System Analysis.
Development of the R eductionistic System Model
The concept of a Reductionistic Model is consistent with Stark (2000) and Verschuren (2002) 
in that the system must be reduced to its base components to allow for the necessary 
documentation o f the system variables for scientific research to occur. The procedure used is 
based on COMNAVSURFLANT Proactive Maintenance Procedures Handbook (AMSEC 
LLC, 2003). The procedure presented allows for reductionism to establish the components 
contained with in a system to be studied, and the identification o f failure modes. The 
procedure was reviewed and is consistent with the literature.
The first step in the development o f the Reductionistic System Model is defining the system 
and its physical and functional boundaries. In this way a focused analysis can be accomplished. 
Expanding the boundaries too wide defeats the purpose of the study by introducing too many 
variables. The system definition is accomplished in three parts:
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•  Determine and verify the system component block diagram
• Determine and validate the system functional block diagram
• Create system functional top breakdown (TDBD) diagram.
The second step is equipment verification and validation. This requires the comparison of the 
configuration data (inventory and parts from the maintenance system for the 
repair/replacement o f system components) to the functional TDBD. The result o f this 
comparison is the creation of an inventory matrix o f the component parts of the system.
Discrepancies are resolved with site visits to the system or platform under question for
validation and verification o f the existence o f the components under question.
The final step in the Reductionistic System Model is the development o f the system functional 
description and failure definitions. The greatest difference in the development o f this portion 
of the system model departs from conventional maintenance thinking is the realization that 
component failure does not equate to system failure as the system or sub system may have 
inherent redundancies that can compensate for the failure of a single component. Failure of 
system function is the focus of this step in development of the system model. The three major 
phases in this analysis is the development of:
•  System functional description
•  System functional failure definition and,
® The development o f a system functional failure matrix.
This resultant is the structured failure matrix that allows the query o f system experts on the 
behavior o f the system as the result o f a potential failure.
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Holistic Perspective
The literature suggests that the use of FMEA (Failure mode and effects analysis) (US MIL-Std- 
1629A, 1980/1984) as a means to develop a knowledge basis (Barkai, 1999; Wirth et ai, 
1996;Yacoub and Ammar, 2002; Goossens and Cooke, 1997) to model the system. While 
Goossens and Cooke along with Yacoub and Ammar use the method as a means to identify 
potential risk in system failure in the design of complex systems, Wirth et al and Barkai elude 
to the use o f the FEMA to generate diagnostic expert systems and knowledge-based support 
of systems analysis.
Most of the current FMEA literature focuses on use o f FMEA with concurrent system design. 
Design FMEA is a standardized technique widely used in the automotive, aerospace and other 
industries that is used to identify prioritize and eliminate known and potential failures, 
problems and errors from systems under design before product release (Bowles, 1998; Lee, 
2001) [Table 4].
Task Method
Build FEMA Model Structure Elaborate ‘causal’ chain failure dependencies; 
(Causes > Failure Modes > Effects)
Score and Prioritize Assess Risk Priority Numbers (RPN); 
(failure frequency * end-effect severity * 
detection difficulty)
Decide and Act Optimize design improvements, tradeoffs, 
test plans, manufacturing changes, etc.
Table 4, Design FMEA, adapted from Lee (2001).
Traditionally, this model is used to focus limited design resources on critical design tradeoffs 
and decisions leading to improved reliability, quality and safety (Stamatis, 1995). This iterative 
process is often used to influence design by identifying failure modes, assessing their 
probabilities o f occurrence and their effects on the system, isolating their causes, and 
determining corrective action or preventative measures (Ebeling, 1997).
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The systems under study for this research effort are at maturity levels that preclude this as a 
viable option to establish redesign parameters, however it appears that the use of this tool at a 
higher level to establish a knowledge base to elicit expertise in the system areas that are to be 
addressed will be invaluable. Development of a FMEA for each system uniquely particular to 
the class to which it belongs will vary dependant on the stage of the system’s lifecycle. The 
primary application o f FMEA in this instance is to translate a set o f qualitative relationships 
that exist in the complex system, based on the widely held beliefs o f the system stakeholders, 
into a quantitative data set (RPN — risk priority number).
A system level FMEA is a structured process to identify potential failures and the effect of 
these failures on system performance. The RPN is a critical factor, which considers equipment 
complexity, mission needs, performance criteria, redundant assets, consequences of failures, 
safety, legislated requirements and other comparable salient criteria. An RPN is developed by 
the selected technical/system experts to determine the relative impact o f each failure mode of 
the FMEA. For this evaluation the RPN looks at three areas:
1. How often a Failure Mode is likely to occur
2. The mission degradation and/or downtime it would cause
3. The level o f repair that would be needed to fix it
This is a departure from the tradition RPN design used in a research and development effort. 
By evaluating these parameters in the development o f the RPN, the result yields a perspective 
not only on the physical system as initially designed, it incorporates the context in which the 
complex system exists within its environment, the rich interaction o f the system on the meta­
system within which it exists, the interaction of the human with the physical environment of
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the system and its effect on the system readiness via maintenance capability of personnel 
assigned to the system.
The RPN may then be used as a management decision support tool that contributes to 
determination o f the appropriate assessing activity for a system. Assignment of assessments to 
the organizational level are made only when the following conditions are met:
1. Required assessment skills are within standard technical capability o f the 
maintenance personnel
2. Requisite test equipment and assessment procedures are readily available
High RPNs indicate potential failures, which have a major system performance impact. 
Assessments for high RPN failures are assigned to technical experts. Assessments for lower 
RPN failures, which tend to have relatively minor system performance impact, can be assigned 
to the system’s maintenance personnel. Before assigning an assessment to system’s 
maintenance personnel the methodology confirms through an iterative process and dialogue 
with the technical experts that the required assessment skills are within standard technical 
capability o f the maintenance personnel; the requisite test equipment and assessment 
procedures are readily available; and potential equipment failure will not create a safety hazard.
The predictive maintenance schema is now more narrowly focused toward the use of technical 
expertise only on those failure modes that dictate through the resultant high RPN.
Summary
The use of both the Reductionistic and Holistic perspectives can capture the complexities o f a 
legacy system. Reducing the complex system to its base components to model the failure 
modes provide sufficient structure for the development of a holistic approach to quantify the
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experts knowledge. The presentation o f the conceptual model allows for the use o f the 
knowledge held by the experts by management in a manner that may be used to base decisions 
on whether assessment o f the system is warranted.
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C H A P T E R  I V  
RESEARCH M ETH O DO LO G Y
Introduction
Before discussing the research methodology used in this effort, it is important to reiterate the 
problem statement, introduce the population details of the study and restate the research 
question prior to the discussion o f the methods that will be used to test the conceptual model.
Frequently, large-scale maintenance o f complex systems (i.e., a naval vessel) is based on the 
reduction of the system to its base subcomponents and the use of manufacturer-suggested, 
time-directed, preventative maintenance, which is augmented during the systems lifecycle with 
predictive maintenance which assesses the systems ability to perform its mission objectives. 
This maintenance scheme ignores the complexity of the system it tries to maintain. By 
combining the base components or subsystems into a larger system, and introducing human 
interaction with the system, the complexity o f the system creates a unique entity that cannot be 
completely understood by basing predictability of the system to perform tasks on the 
reduction of the system to its subcomponents.
This chapter discusses the application o f the conceptual model and the methods used in the 
deployment o f the model in the controlled research environment Hypotheses are put forth 
for the test o f the model to predict the behavior o f the system based on the holistic 
perspective o f the experts. To evaluate the experts, a comparative is used that is based on 
historical records.
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Scope of study
The conceptual model, as described in the pervious chapter, includes a variety of applications 
and approaches (e.g. Complex system modeling, the use of FMEA in maintenance practices, 
expert elicitation for model development). To test all these is beyond the scope o f this 
dissertation. Furthermore, it is possible that the methodology presented will have different 
effectiveness for:
• Differences in system type
•  System size
•  Technical nature o f the system
• Human interactions with the system
• Availability of data regarding the system
• And others
A population must be selected which will control for these factors, or these factors must be 
addressed in the analysis. In this research effort the first approach will be used. Several 
delimitations have to be made which will allow the problem to be constrained sufficiently. For 
purposes of this research and to test the model, the Low Pressure and Medium Pressure Air 
Compressor (LP-MPAC) systems on various ship platforms will be used. The LP-MPAC 
systems were selected, as previous work was available to support the research. This research 
will make use o f previously collected data to test the use o f the holistic modeling portion o f the 
conceptual model. COMNAVSURFLANT has previously developed a guideline for the 
development o f the theoretical modes o f failure for their ship systems. Application o f this 
guideline will aid in the selection of and development o f the reductonistic systems model and 
will provide structure for testing the research hypothesis.
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Research Question
Based on the literature discussed in the previous section, tools like FMEA exist to assist in the 
design o f systems. Little or no methodology is apparent with respect to the decision process 
that encompasses the application of corrective actions for existing systems accounting for the 
degradation of the system, overtime, based on knowledge tightly held by system experts. The 
question to be answered by this research is: can a methodology that uses the expert knowledge, 
elicited from system experts through a high level FMEA, be used to create a knowledge based 
decision support system to aid in the assessment o f legacy systems?
Population Details 
Overview of SE M A T  II  Process
The Systems and Equipment Material Assessment Team (SEMAT II) visit is a condition based 
assessment program for hull, mechanical and electrical (HM&E) systems and equipment This 
visit occurs simultaneously with the C5RA (a combat systems, command, control, 
communications and computer readiness, condition based assessment program). Current 
policy is to move toward the consolidation o f redundant inspections and assessment visits to 
improve the availability o f ships for deployment. SEMAT II visits are designed to be two- 
week visits comprised o f civilian, military and contractor field service engineers to assess 
onboard equipment, offer technical repair expertise and provide deck-plate level training to 
ships personnel
Scheduled on a once per maintenance cycle basis, the visit occurs four to six months prior to 
deployment following ships major availability for shipyard repair and overhaul. The visit is in
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support of a US Navy move toward a condition based maintenance program rather than a 
time directive maintenance program. Figure 4 contains the ship maintenance cycle and the 
position of SEMAT II in that process.
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Figure 4, Ship Maintenance Schematic, source: 
COMNAVSURFLANT internal document
The cost of performing the SEMAT II/C5RA assessment and time limiting factors are 
compelling reasons to move toward an effective, knowledge/information-based, reliability 
system using a structured decision process and the data available from the Ships 3-M OARS 
system.
U se of Secondary Data
The existence of historical failure data allows for a benchmark for the research from which a 
conclusion may be drawn. This gives internal validity to the research, and a standard to provide a
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means of measure. To test the conceptual model, it will be necessary to uses secondary data from 
existing historical databases.
What is secondary data? Data may be described as primary or secondary. The researcher himself 
collects primary data. Secondary data is often collected by others and "re-used" by the researcher. 
The process of research involves some consideration of previous work in the same field. All 
researchers read and use the research of others. In the same way that it is possible for a researcher 
to review the previous work in any field and still go on to carry out original work, it is possible for 
a researcher to carry out a secondary analysis and still go on to carry out original work (Gorard, 
2002). Secondary data analysis is being used extensively in many fields such as astronomy, high- 
energy physics, the genome project, statistics, economics, and psychological health surveys 
(Church, 2001; Keller and Warrack, 1997; Cooper and Schindler, 1998). Secondary data is a viable 
resource to aid the research process.
Speed and cost are the most obvious advantages of using secondary data. Since the data already 
exists, it is by definition generally quicker to ‘collect’, involving less travel and minimal cost 
(Gorard, 2002). Care should be taken when using secondary data, as errors may have been 
introduced as a result of the transcription or due to misinterpretation of the original terminology 
and definitions employed (Keller and Warrack, 1997).
Secondary data is generally used for three research purposes. First it fills a need for a specific 
reference or citation on some point — perhaps in a research proposal, to demonstrate why the 
proposed research fills a void in the knowledge base. It allows for a reference benchmark 
against which to test other findings. Second, secondary data is an integral part of a larger 
research study or o f a research report to justify having bypassed the costs and benefits of 
doing primary research. Third, secondary data may be used as the sole basis for a research 
study, since in many situations one cannot conduct primary research because o f physical, legal,
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or cost influences. Retrospective research often requires the use o f published data (Cooper and 
Schindler, 1998).
In many studies the power of secondary data is allied to the flexibility o f primary data 
techniques. One way in which all studies can gain from integrating secondary data is to set the 
context for the primary data. Even relatively large-scale data collection cannot compete in size 
and quality with existing records, so re-analysis o f these records can be helpful in a variety of 
ways. It can provide the figures for each stratafum] in a stratified sample (else how do you 
know what proportions to use?). It can be used to assess the quality o f an achieved 
population. These figures can then be used to weight the sample if there is a clear basis in its 
composition. Contextual secondary data can also be used to ague that a problem exists to be 
solved by other techniques, and to begin to describe the nature o f that problem. (Gorard, 
2002)
The most important limitation o f secondary data sources is that the information may not meet 
your specific needs. Others have collected source material for their own purposes. Operational 
definitions will differ and may not be available for evaluation, units of measure are different, 
and different times may be involved or environmental stimuli may not be compatible. It may 
be difficult to assess the accuracy of the information because one knows little about the 
research design or the conditions under which the research occurred, unless the agent who 
collected the data is impeccably credentialed and has documented the procedures. (Cooper and 
Schindler, 1998) The investigator is dependent on other researchers’ decisions regarding the 
population, sampling design, and measures used in data collection. Consequently, researchers 
must accept the limitations o f the data set or not use that data set. Second, whatever measures 
were collected are the only ones for use. Each investigator must decide if the included
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1997)
Because not all data that comes from secondary sources is valid, Ormrod and Leady (2001) 
submit that one means o f reducing the use of defective data is that there be a criteria for the 
admissibility o f data. This issue has heightened importance in secondary data analysis because 
the investigator was not involved in the data collection (Mainous and Hueston, 1997). It is 
further compounded from the aspect that the secondary data may come from various sources 
that had a variety o f collection methods. Therefore, to ensure the integrity of the research, 
standards for the acceptance of the secondary data needs to be established from the outset.
Specifically in this age o f ‘data-mining’ from large databases, that the researcher has little 
control over the data that has been entered, it is critical that the process through which the 
data is to be elicited from the database is documented, clearly and stringently, to remove 
possible bias in the resulting data set. This process for the development o f associative rules 
must, like the development of a complex system model, be an iterative process and must fit 
the context o f the research methodology. Data and methodology are inextricably 
interdependent (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).
In the development o f the associative rules necessary to extract data from the database, the use 
of linguistic terms in a top down mining algorithm allows for the a progressively deepening 
approach to finding large interest item sets (Hong et al, 2003). Agrawal et al. (1993) propose 
several mining algorithms based on the concept o f large item sets. In their research, the 
mining process was divided into two phases. In the first phase, candidate item sets were 
counted by scanning the database. If  the data set was larger than a predefined threshold then 
the item set was determined a large item set. Item sets containing single items were processed
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first, large item sets were re-mined and filtered to reduce redundancies in the data entry and 
then segmented based on confidence intervals.
It is important to note that these procedures for defining the item set mirrors the concepts 
developed in systems model development. The systems architect should begin by addressing 
the what (system), how (sub-systems) and why (the wider-system or system environment) of 
the problem context (Checkland, 1999). The problem context developed is meant to give the 
systems architect a means to clearly identify the system that is to be studied. By casing an 
initial wide net, and through an iterative process, the researcher can accomplish the task of 
collecting a valid data set from the database. By using the existing structure of the operational 
system being studied for the research effort, a part-of-hierarchy may be developed that 
provides the linguistic filter necessary got capture the appropriate data from the initial data 
repository- wide scan; this can be used to aid in the development of the filtering algorithms 
necessary to eliminate unsuitable data. The researcher must ultimately decide what data 
resulting from this process must be willingly omitted, and document the reasons for omissions.
By administering the process in a consistent, well-documented manner, that resultant 
secondary data yielded from this filtration, has validity that has been gained through the 
stringently documented, consistent process established by the researcher prior to the mining of 
the data. Appendix E  details the development o f the secondary data used to validate the 
conceptual model.
Test of Hypothesis
This test may be preformed in a variety o f ways. However for simplicity, the first test o f the 
hypothesis will be a comparison o f the consensus generated by the expert FMEA and the 
FMEA generated through historical data (figure 5) i.e. RPNE is equal to RPNH. This would 
support the research question posed, “Can a methodology that uses the expert knowledge,
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elicited from system experts through a high level FMEA, be used to create a knowledge based 
decision support system to stream line assessment o f legacy systems?” However, for this 
question to be answered positively the RPN resulting from the expert could also be greater 
than the RPN developed from the historical data set, i.e. RPNE is greater than RPNH. Having 
an RPNE greater than or equal to RPNH would also imply that the expert judgment is more 
holistic in its assessment o f the system, and that knowledge captured through the FMEA 
process can form the basis o f a decision support system. Consequently the hypothesis 
statement can be represented as:






implication of Historical 
Failure Data
Expert Knowledge EUcitotim
Figure 5, Test o f Conceptual Model.
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The same reasoning may be applied to the independent factors o f the RPN modelThe 
independent factors will also be compared to the historical data, yielding the following 
hypotheses to be evaluated by the research:
H 0 : SE < S H H0 : RE < RH H0: 0 E < 0 H
H x:S e > S h H x :Re > R h H x :0 e > 0 h
(Hypothesis 2) (Hypothesis 3) (Hypothesis 4)
It is expected that the factors will be greater in value from the experts due to their holistic 
perspective of the system under study.
Another hypothesis to be tested is “does a factor or factors exist that contribute to resulting 
RPN in a greater proportion.” To test that hypothesis, the following hypotheses will also be 
evaluated:
H 0 :S e *Oe < S b * Oh H q :R e * S e < R h * S h H 0 :Oe * R e < O h * R h
H x : S E * 0 E > S H * 0 H H x :Re * S e > R h * $ h H x :Oe * R e > O h *R h
(Hypothesis 5) (Hypothesis 6) (Hypothesis 7)
Again it can be presumed that the expert having a more holistic view o f the system will devise 
a greater value in the consensus due to their holistic view of the system. The comparison of 
the expert to the historical RPNs provides an aggregation o f the differences between the 
models. This allows for the reduction of the need to assess failure modes in which the 
historical and the expert are in concurrence and conserve resources to address the disparity 
between the resultant RPNs to achieve greater efficiency in the overall assessment of the 
system being studied.
Selection of Statistical Techniques
Siegel (1957) suggests that the choice among statistical test which might be used with a given 
research design should be based on the these three criteria:
1. The statistical model of the test should fit the conditions of research.
2. The measurement requirement of the tests should be met by the measures used in the 
research
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3. From among those tests with appropriate statistical models and appropriate 
measurement requirements, that test should be chosen which has the greatest power 
efficiency.
Within the category of inferential statistics, specific analytic techniques are classified as either 
parametric or nonparametric. Parametric include such widely recognized tests as the Student’s t test 
and the analysis of variance (ANOVA). Researchers using these and other parametric statistics 
must test several assumptions with regard to the coding and distribution of the variables they are 
studying. In most cases, parametric statistics require that data be normally distributed, that the 
variance is equal (i.e., homogeneous) in the data set and the dependent variables be continuous in 
nature, measured on either an interval or ratio scale (Fitzgerald et al, 2001)
Nonparametric techniques are generally used to test ranked data. Rather than testing to determine 
whether the pi and \iz differ, it tests whether the population locations differ. Additionally, if the 
data are non-normally distributed, t-tests are invalid. Nonparametric techniques may be used as 
well in this instance.
In the selection of a measure to provide verification and validation of research data, various 
statistical models were evaluated for use in this endeavor. Figure 6 provides the logic used in 
choosing an appropriate statistical methodology.
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r -  ■*---j
, m i  1
Figure 6, adapted from Keller, IC and B. Warrack, Statistics for 
Management and Economics, 4th Ed. (do not print in color)
Following the logic o f figure 6, it is noted that the statistical test model used will be a Wilcoxon 
rank sum test, a nonparametric statistical test. There are obvious drawbacks to the use of this 
type o f analysis. Nonparametric statistical models are not as ridged as their parametric
counterparts. Therefore, the conclusions that may be drawn from them are more general in
nature when using them to elicit statistical inference. However, it allows for the use of 
hypothesis testing on data that is nonnormally distributed. Additionally, appropriate 
parametric techniques will be used to develop inference in the absence of an appropriate non­
parametric statistical method.
Detailed Research Approach
The Reductionistic System Model for the LP-MPAC, and the Historical Data used to populate 
the Statistical RPN Comparative, was developed through a joint effort with
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COMNAVSURFLANT, AMSEC LLC, SUPSHIP Portsmouth and FTSCLANT. For this 
effort wherever the data used was from a secondary source, the procedure used to originally 
collect the data has been reviewed for consistency with the conceptual model and the 
literature. The necessary procedures for the collection of the secondary data are abridged in 
this narrative and data sources are provided for reference in Appendix E.
System Identification
Validation of the conceptual model, as previously outlined, will be done using the Low 
Pressure and Medium Pressure Air Compressor (LP-MPAC) systems on various ships in the 
US Navy.
The Reductionistic System Model for the LP-MPAC, and the Historical Data used to populate 
the Statistical RPN Comparative, was developed through a joint effort with 
COMNAVSURFLANT, AMSEC LLC, SUPSHIP Portsmouth and FTSCLANT. The 
method used to develop the Reductionistic System Model is documented in the 
COMNAVSURFLANT Proactive Maintenance Procedures Handbook (AMSEC LLC, 2002). 
The results of the development of the Reductionistic Model for the LP-MPAC are synopsized 
from internal COMNAVSURFLANT documents (LP-MP Failure Mode Report, August 
2002), for consistency in the research.
System D escription
The low-pressure air plant and systems supply air at required pressure for use in non-critical 
ship service air systems (those systems which can tolerate and operate satisfactorily with 
interruption o f the air service) and vital control air systems. In SURFLANT, medium 
pressure air plants and systems typically supply air at required pressure for services and 
equipment such as, but not limited to:
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1. Propulsion diesel starting
2. Diesel generator starting
3. Sea chest blow, whistle
4. Pneumatic clutch
5. Shaft brakes
Each low and medium pressure air plant is typically shipped from the manufacturer as a 
“skid ” mounted unit. Some of these air plants have dehydrators and receivers mounted on 
the skid while others have these components installed downstream. For the purpose o f this 
analysis, the study boundary for the low and medium pressure air plants will consist o f all 
components, piping and associated controls between the air inlet up to and including any 
dehydrators installed prior to an air receiver. The air receiver will be outside o f the study 
boundary. The following major components are considered to be within the air plant study 
boundary: Electric drive motor and motor controller, drive gear or coupling, air
filter/silencer, compressor assembly, oil pump, moisture separators, dehydrators (LPACs 
only), heat exchangers/ coolers, temperature and pressure sensors, associated gages, valves, 
hoses and piping.
SURFLANT uses reciprocating compressors (RCP-M) for their medium pressure 
compressed air plants and uses reciprocating (RCP-L), NAXI Rotary Helical Screw (RHS-N) 
and STAR Rotary Helical Screw (RHS-S) compressors for their low-pressure compressed air 
plants. The component block diagrams for these air plants are illustrated in Figures 7, 8, 9 
and 10.
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Figure 7, Component Block Diagram - Low Pressure Reciprocating 
Air Plants, COMNAVSURFLANT internal document
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115 VAC, 60 HZ 
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Figure 8, Component Block Diagram - Low Pressure Rotary Helical Screw (NAXI) Air 
Plants, COMNAVSURFLANT internal document.
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Figure 9. Component Block Diagram - Low Pressure Rotary Helical 
Screw (STAR) Air Plants, COMNAVSURFLANT internal 
document.
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Figure 10, Component Block Diagram - Medium Pressure 
Reciprocating Air Plants, COMNAVSURFLANT internal 
document.
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Functional Diagram
The low and medium pressure air plants are used to supply air to shipboard low and medium 
air pressure systems and to maintain the system pressure at the desired level. Ships in the 
current Force have low pressure and medium pressure air plants rated at 100-150 PSI and 
600 PSI respectively. A functional block diagram is presented in Figure 11.
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Figure 11, Low and Medium Pressure Air Plant Functional Block 
Diagram, COMNAVSURFLANT internal document.
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Functional Topdown Breakdown
Figure 12 illustrates the relationship of the various components o f Low Pressure and 
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Figure 12, Low and Medium Pressure Air Plant Functional Top- 
down Breakdown.
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Equipment Verification And Validation
An Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) Analyst, with assistance from a Data Analyst, 
verified and validated equipment contained within the defined system. They inventoried and 
documented the equipment/components o f the system, comparing the developed 
component diagrams and the configuration data from the Maintenance Management 
Information System (MMIS). Ship W ork Line Item Number (SWLIN) and Allowance Parts 
List (APL). This resulted in the creation o f a master matrix that allows segregation of 
discrepancies into APL and Unit Identification Code (UIC) or ship class specific data. This 
matrix is used to determine the “bad actors” within the groups, cost and downtime 
comparisons, etc. Additionally, this determined the relative accuracy/completeness o f the 
configuration data in the MMIS. There are three phases to this step o f the process:
•  Compare configuration data to the component block diagram comparison,
•  Perform site validation, if required,
• Create inventory matrix /  matrices.
Low and Medium Pressure Air Plant Population Data
In order to identify all applicable low and medium pressure air plants used in the Force, a 
query was performed on the Ship Configuration and Logistic Support Information System 
(SCLSIS) using the following Ship W ork Line Item Numbers (SWLIN):
•  55120 -  Air System, Low and Medium Pressure
•  55121 -  Air System, Low and Medium Pressure
• 55152 — Compressors, MP Air and
• 55153 -  Compressors, LP Air
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This yielded a SURFLANT inventory o f all low and medium pressure air plants by APL, 
ship class, hull number and compressor type Reciprocating (RCP), Rotary Helical Screw— 
STAR (RHS-S), Rotary Helical Screw-NAXI (RHS-N). The data date was 29 March 2002. 
The data used is not provided for reference due to military classification. During the 
equipment verification and validation some discrepancies in the SCLSIS data were found. 
Physical verification was performed. Data was adjusted to reflect the results of the physical 
verification.
Functional Description/Failure Definition
System Functional Failure is the inability o f a system to meet a specified performance 
standard. A complete loss o f function is clearly a functional failure, as is the inability to 
perform at the minimum level defined as satisfactory. All functional failures are not equal, 
because they do not have equal effects on the mission or safety o f the ship. To accomplish 
this step o f the process, it is necessary to further define the functions and associated 
functional failures for the system. Functional failures are quantified by determining what is 
too much, too little or degraded functional outputs for the system. In the Navy there is an 
operational aspect to this process in that functional failure often presents itself as a loss of 
mission area, which must be reported via the Casualty Reporting (CASREP) system. 
Functional failures can often be thought o f as leading to C3 or C4 CASREP level failures.
Once all function definitions are determined, each is given a sequential number and added to 
a matrix. The number assigned will be used for tracking purposes throughout the rest o f the 
study. The product o f this step o f the process is the completion o f a list or matrix o f system
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function and functional failure definitions. Table 5 provides a list o f the low and medium 
pressure air plant system functions and their respective system functional failures. This 
matrix is critical to developing the theoretical system failure modes.
System Functional
D escription System Functional Failure Definitions
1. Air Compression
1A N o Pressure. N o Canadtri
IB Low Pressure13. Low C am dtri
1C Pressure Satisfactory. Low Canadtv*
2. Cooling




3A N o lubrication
3B Inadequate lubrication
4. Direct Flow 
(Air or Fluids)
4A No flow (Ait or Fluids'!
4B Incorrect flow fAir or fluids flow to incorrect location!
4C Restricted flow
5. System Self Protection
5A Casualty exists, no shutdown
5B Casualty does not exist, shutdown occurs





7A No containment (ruDturel
7B Partial containment (leak!
8. Water Removal 8A Moisture content too high
Notes:
a. A functional failure for ‘low  capacity” is 25% below rated value.
b. A functional failure for “low pressure” is defined as a condition where the output pressure cannot reach the compressor
unloading pressure with a light load condition.
Table 5, LP-MPAC Functional Failure Matrix, Adapted from 
COMNAVSURI A N T  LP-MP Report, 2001.
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Failure Mode D eterm ination
This step of the process is an analysis o f the failure modes and maintenance strategy 
associated with the predominant failing component o f  the system. It was conducted by the 
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) Analyst, and involves a detailed theoretical and 
scientific engineering look at each o f the failures defined previously, with a goal o f narrowing 
the field down to the most predominant failing component(s) and associated predominant 
failure mode(s) o f the system. This is accomplished through a process o f theoretical 
analysis, followed by comparison and grouping o f actual maintenance data.
Determine Theoretical Failure Modes
The first step is designed to determine a list o f the theoretical failure modes for each system 
component associated with each functional failure o f the system as determined previously. 
These failure modes are generated from the system technical manuals, NSTM (Naval Ships 
Technical Manual) chapters, system specifications, and subject matter expert interviews. 
Using the Functional Failure Matrix, Table 5, a list o f theoretical failure modes was 
generated and provided in Table 6. The table lists each Functional Failure and the most 
probable theoretical failure modes that would affect the functionality o f the low and medium 
pressure air plants. Each o f the theoretical failure modes is assigned a unique Failure Mode 
Code (FMC) for accounting purposes.
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1A No Pressure, N o Capacity
R eciprocating/R otary  Helical Screw 
1A1 Motor failure
1A2 Shutdown switch failed in shutdown position 
1A3 Motor controller failure
Reciprocating Only
1A4 Drive Belt(s) broken
1A5 Pulley failure
1A6 Piston failure
1A7 Piston ring melted /  seized
1A8 Piston cracked
1A9 Connecting rod bent
1A10 Connection rod bearing failure
1A11 Crankshaft bent, broken /  cracked
Rotary Helical Screw Only
1A12 Rotor set seized
1A13 Rotor bearing failure
1A14 Rotor timing gears failure (RHS-N only)
1A15 Unloading system fails 
1A16 Coupling failure
1A17 Injection cooling/sealing water (low Pressure)
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System Functional 
Failure D efinition Theoretical Failure Modes
IB Low Pressure, Low Capacity
Reciprocating/Rotary Helical Screw
1B1 Unloader valve partially open
1B2 Relief valve (activating too low a pressure)
1B3 Relief valve (failed open)
1B4 Drain valves partially open 
1B5 Air filter/ silencer restricted 
1B6 Piping or gaskets Leaks
Reciprocating Only
1B7 Piston rings worn or broken 
1B8 Blown head gasket 
1B9 Piston cylinder liner worn 
1B10 Suction /  discharge valves leaking 
1B11 Loose/ slipping drive belts 
1B12 Piston air rod packing worn
Rotary H elical Screw Only
1B13 Rotor set worn 
IB 14 Blown casing gasket
1C Pressure Satisfactory, Low Capacity
Reciprocating/Rotary Helical Screw
1C1 Piping or gaskets Leaks
1C2 Drain valves open or partially open
1C3 Outlet check valve (opening restricted)
Reciprocating Only
1C4 Suction / discharge valves leaking
1C5 Piston rings worn
1C6 Cylinder unloader fails in open position
Rotary Helical Screw Only
1C7 Rotor set worn
1C8 Unloader valve partially opened
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System Functional 
Failure Definition Theoretical Failure Modes
2A No cooling
R eciprocating/R otary  Helical Screw 
2A1 Air line restriction
2A2 FW heat exchanger (SW side) blocked (All except 
RCP-M)
2A3 FW heat exchanger (F/W  side) blocked (All except
RCP-M)
2A4 N o fresh water coolant (All except RCP-M)
2A5 Lube oil pump failure (All except RHS-S)
Reciprocating Only
2A6 Thermostatic valve failure 
2A7 Fresh water pump failure 
2A8 Clogged oil strainer
Rotaty Helical Screw Only
2A9 Fresh water injection cooling water system failure
2B Inadequate cooling
Reciprocating/Rotary Helical Screw
2B1 FW heat exchanger restricted or air bound (S/W 
side)
2B2 FW heat exchanger restricted or air bound (F/W  
side)
2B3 Oil pump worn (All except RHS-S)
2B4Low fresh water coolant level (All except RCP-M)
Reciprocating Only
2B5 Fresh water pump worn (All except RCP-M)
2B6 Intercoolers /  Aftercoolers (S/W side restricted) 
2B7 Thermostatic control valve malfunctioning
Rotary H elical Screw Only
2B8 Fresh water injection cooling/sealing water system 
failure (low pressure/flow)
2B9 Separator holding tank leak (Low pressure)
2B10 Oil flow restricted (RHS-N only)
2C Excessive cooling Reciprocating/Rotary Helical Screw
2C1 Excessive seawater cooling water flow
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System Functional 
Failure Definition Theoretical Failure Modes
3A No lubrication
Reciprocating/Rotary Helical Screw
3A1 Lube oil pump failure (All except RHS-S) 
3A2 No oil level (All except RHS-S)
Reciprocating Only
3A3 Clogged oil strainer
Rotary Helical Screw Only
3A4 Oil cooler (oil side) blocked (RHS-N only) 
3A5 N o Fresh water injection (RHS-S only)
3B Inadequate lubrication
Reciprocating/Rotary Helical Screw
3B1 Low oil level (All except RHS-S)
3B2 Oil pump worn (All except RHS-S)
3B3 Oil filter clogged (All except RHS-S)
Reciprocating Only
3B4 Clogged oil strainer
Rotary Helical Screw Only
3B5 Oil cooler (oil side) restricted (RHS-N only)
3B6 Clogged oil nozzles (RHS-N only)
3B7 Low fresh water injection pressure (RHS-S only)
4A No flow (Air or fluids)
Reciprocating/Rotary Helical Screw
4A1 Improper valve position (shut)
4A2 Valve failure (failed shut)
4B Incorrect flow (Air o f fluids flow to 
incorrect location)
Reciprocating/Rotary H elical Screw
4B1 Improper valve position (shut/open) 
4B2 Valve failure (leakage)
4B3 Valve failure (failed shut)
4B4 Valve failure (failed open)
4C Restricted flow
Reciprocating/Rotary Helical Screw
4C1 Valve in mid-position
4C2 Clogged strainer
4C3 Cooling system restricted (S/W side)
4C4 Cooling system (FW side) restricted (Except RCP-
M)
4C5 Air filter/silencer restricted
Rotary Helical Screw only
4C6 Injection water filter restricted
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5A Casualty exists, no shutdown
R eciprocating/R otary  Helical Screw 
5A1 Trips do not activate (Refer to Table 5-2) 
5A2 Relief valve (activating pressure too high)
5B Casualty does not exist, shutdown 
occurs
R eciprocating/R otary  Helical Screw
5B1 Trips activate without failure condition present
(refer to Table 5-2)
5C Casualty exists, shutdown 
too slow
Reciprocating/Rotary Helical Screw
5C1 Sensing lines fouled
Reciprocating Only
5C2 Oil pressure sensing timer failure
Rotary Helical Screw Only
5C3 Injection water / oil pressure timer failure
6A N o sensing
Reciprocating/Rotary Helical Screw
6A1 Pressure sensing -  Sensing line is pinched, clogged, 
kinked, cut or sensing valve closed 
6A2 Temperature sensing — Sensor is fouled or cut 
6A3 Level sensing — Mechanical linkage binding, contacts 
6A4 Sensor opened or shorted (electrically)
6A5 Wiring harness cut/shorted
6B Incorrect sensing
Reciprocating/Rotary Helical Screw
6B1 Pressure sensing — Sensing line is pinched, clogged 
or kinked
6B2 Temperature sensing — Sensor is fouled
6B3 Level sensing — Mechanical linkage binding, contacts
6B4 Sensor out o f calibration
7A N o containment (rupture)
Reciprocating/Rotary Helical Screw
7A1 Head /  casing gaskets seals blown 
7A2 Head /  casing cracked 
7A3 Hoses/Piping ruptured
Reciprocating Only
7A4 Interstage cooler rupture
Rotary Helical Screw Only
7A5 Rupture disk ruptured (RHS-S only)
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System Functional 
Failure Definition T heoretical F ailu re  Modes
7B Partial containment (leak)
Reciprocating/Rotary Helical Screw
7B1 Head /  casing gaskets /  seals leak 
7B2 Gaskets/seals leak
7B3 Hoses/piping cracked, deteriorated or mechanical 
joint failure
Reciprocating Only
7B4 Interstage cooler leak
Rotary H elical Screw Only
7B5 Oil /  Water seal failure (RHS-N only)
8A Moisture content too high
Reciprocating only
8A1 Condensate/water level too high in separator 
8A2 Condensate drain failure
Rotary Helical Screw only
8A3 Water level too high in separator holding tank 
8A4 Chiller/dehydrator dew point temperature too 
high1
Note:
1 -  Depending on die air plant configuration, a “too high” dew point temperature is defined as greater than 50 or 65 degrees.
Application o f E xpert FMEA
Based on the literature, it was determined that a panel o f experts would be necessary to 
develop a holistic perspective on the behavior o f the system. The approach to the elicitation o f 
the experts’ judgment would be a Delphi Methodology, capturing the underlying theme o f the 
literature on expert elicitation as supported by Baecher (2002). Structure for the process is 
provided through the use o f FMEA worksheet provided to the experts. The approach to the 
elicitation is as follows:
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1. Develop a FMEA worksheet based on the theoretical failure modes. The worksheet 
allows the expert to assert his opinion on the three components o f the RPN has 
detailed in the conceptual model based on a nominal scale.
2. Select the panel o f experts displaying a broad spectrum of expertise on the LP-MPAC 
system.
3. Discuss the theoretical failure modes with the experts to determine the applicability for 
use in the effort Take inputs from the experts as to specific line codes for removal 
from the study and where additional codes must be included.
4. Provide training to the experts on how to best approach the quantification o f their 
beliefs on the FMEA worksheet. An example is provided for discussion, and questions 
regarding the scales, provided to guide their opinions, are addressed.
5. The experts are then asked to record their opinions over the next week individually on 
the work sheet provided.
6. The expert worksheets are collected. The mean numeric value o f the expert response 
to each failure mode is then recorded on a worksheet and provided to the group of 
experts.
7. The experts are asked to compare the mean response to each failure mode RPN 
component to their individual response. Discussion among the experts is now 
encouraged and is guided through the facilitator until a consensus is reached on the 
each response. The consensus is recorded as a discrete value.
8. The documented consensus is then distributed to each o f the experts for final review.
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FM EA W orksheet
The FMEA worksheet was developed based on the System Functional Failure Definitions and 
the Theoretical Failure Modes developed by the COMNAVSURFLANT effort. A portion of 
the FMEA worksheet is presented (Figure 13) as an example o f the basic layout of the 

















































Figure 13, FMEA Worksheet Example
Selection o f Experts
Experts were requested from, and provided by, the office o f the Commander Naval Surface 
Fleet Atlantic (COMNAVSURFLANT). Experts provided were selected from FTSCLANT 
(Fleet Technical Support Center Atlantic), AMSEC LLC, SUPSHIP (Supervisor o f Ships) 
Portsmouth, and COMNAV SURFLANT for participation in the process. While the experts 
supplied from the differing organizations had some technical expertise in the LP-MPAC 
system, the FTSCLANT representatives were the absolute technical experts on the LP-MPAC
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system itself. FTSCLANT representatives are certified to assess the system and provide 
technical support to the fleet. The remaining members o f the expert panel were not as 
knowledgeable in the technical areas o f the system, their expertise in the maintenance 
capabilities o f the system operators and the area o f mission effect is recognized as necessary to 
provide breadth to the consensus model.
Each member o f the panel was asked to complete a qualifying questionnaire. The 
questionnaire is supplied in Appendix B, and was used to capture data such as educational 
training, experience with the system, mission requirements and familiarity with existing 
maintenance personnel training to document the expert was qualified to be a member o f the 
panel.
Discussion o f the System Failure Definition and Theoretical Failure Modes and 
Expert Training on Scoring the FMEA Categories
Experts on the panel reviewed the theoretical failure modes. Modifications were made to 
arrive at an agreement on the cause of specific failure modes and the worksheet was revised 
accordingly. Additionally the experts were given direction on how to complete the FMEA 
worksheet Appendix A is an example FMEA worksheet and a group o f Tables that provide 
guidance to the arrival at a nominal scale score to be used when filling out the FMEA 
worksheet This information was presented to the expert panel and reviewed to ensure that all 
experts were in agreement on the scales used to score their opinions.
Com pilation of Expert O pinion
Expert FMEA work sheets were collected and compiled. The average scores for each RPN 
factor was then calculated and provided to the experts. After a lengthy discussion, a consensus
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was reached and recorded. The FMEA worksheet was then presented to the experts for final 
review.
Research Methodology Summary
A reductonistic systems model was developed. From that model, and through expert elicitation 
via a modified FMEA, expert model a holistic perspective o f system behavior was modeled 
through the production o f RPNs based on the tightly held knowledge of the experts. The 
results were then compared to an RPN comparative of historical data and existing 
maintenance procedural guidelines to test the model developed. The analysis o f data and the 
interpretation o f the results will be discussed in the next chapter.
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This chapter discusses the assimilation of a panel o f experts and compares the consensus of 
the expert panel in the development o f RPNs to the historical RPN comparative. The expert 
RPN and historical RPN are graphically compared. Additionally nonparametric statistics are 
used to make inferences about the two RPN types (expert and historical). Observations of 
each test of the four Platforms: A, B, C, and D  are made and presented in this chapter along 
with test of the three factors comprising the RPN. Finally regression analysis is used to 
determine subsets exerting the greatest influence in the resultant RPN.
Assimilation o f Expert Panel
As stated in the previous chapter, a panel o f experts was convened. Experts were selected 
from FTSCLANT, AMSEC LLC, SUPSHIP Portsmouth, and COMNAVSURFLANT for 
participation in the process. While the experts supplied from the differing organizations had 
some technical expertise in the LP-MPAC system, the FTSCLANT representatives were the 
absolute technical experts on the LP-MPAC system itself. FTSCLANT representatives are 
certified by COMNAV SURFLANT to assess the system and provide technical support to the 
fleet. The remaining members of the expert panel were knowledgeable in the technical areas of 
the system, and held expertise in the maintenance capabilities of the system operators and the 
area of mission effect is recognized as necessary to provide breadth to the consensus model.
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Each member o f the panel was asked to complete a qualifying questionnaire. The 
questionnaire is suppEed in Appendix B, and was used to capture data such as educational 
training, experience with the system, mission requirements and familiarity with existing 
maintenance personnel training to document the expert was quahfied to be a member o f the 
panel. The rejection threshold for this effort was less than 5 years experience in the area of 
expertise assigned. This was confirmed by COMNAVSURFLANT for the experts provided; 
no experts were rejected based on this criteria from those provided by 
COMNAVSURFLANT.
Expert Education and Training Group Affiliation Area of Expertise
A High School 20+ yrs experience with LPAC/MPAC System FTSCLANT
Maintenance and Repair of 
LPAC/MPAC Systems
B BSMEMS SUPSHIP Maintenance Policy
C BSME SUPSHIP Maintenance Policy
D BSME COMNAVSURFLANT Process Engineering. Maintenance Strategy








OEM Training on LPAC/MPAC Platforms 
BSMET
FTSCLANT Maintenance and Repair of LPAC/MPAC Systems
H
BSEM, MEM 
10+ Years Experience LPAC/MPAC 
Maintenance and Repair
FTSCLANT Supervisor of LPAC/MPAC Maintenance Atlantic Fleet
Table 7, Expert demographics.
Experts on the panel reviewed the theoretical failure modes. Modifications were made to 
arrive at an agreement on the cause of specific failure modes and the worksheet was revised 
accordingly. Additionally the experts were given direction on how to complete the FMEA 
worksheet Appendix A is an example FMEA worksheet and a group of tables that provide 
guidance to the arrival at a nominal scale score to be used when filling out the FMEA 
worksheet This information was presented to the expert panel and reviewed to ensure that all 
experts were in agreement on the scales used to score their opinions.
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Results
Data was compiled and reviewed. The study addressed 113 different ships. Among the 113 
ships there were 305 air compressors distributed among the LP-MPAC systems. Two distinct 
configuration types were observed in the LP-MPAC systems studied based on the type of 
compressor: RHS (Rotary Helical Screw) and RCP (Reciprocating). RHS type configuration 
additionally decomposed into two classes: RHS-S (Rotary Helical Screw — Star) and RHS-N 
(Rotary Helical Screw — NAXI). RHS compressors were used only on LPAC systems. RCP 
compressors were used on both LPAC and MPAC systems. Additionally the systems 
understudy were grouped according to the number of air compressors the system contained. 
To test the model only reciprocating compressors were used, as they were of consistent class 
and type. These were then grouped into the four platforms for comparison based on system 
similarity.
Comparison of R PN E to R PN H
Based on system configuration, between 77 and 87 distinct failure modes were addressed in 
each platform. Once the RPNs were compiled from the experts FMEA, the data (in the form 
o f the Expert RPN) was weighed against the Historical RPN comparative developed for the 
test of the hypothesis presented in the previous chapter as Hypothesis 1. Initially data was 
graphed to visualize the differences in the Expert RPN and the Historical RPN comparative. 
An example o f the graphical representation is shown in figures 14-17.
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While a graphical approach showed that the Expert RPN trended as expected, further 
statistical tests were deemed necessary. A Wilcoxon sign rank sum test for matched pairs was 
used to evaluate the data. The selection o f use for the non-parametric statistical analysis was 
based on the non-normality of the expert responses. SPSS was used to perform the analysis.
Summary Table Nonparametric Statistical Test
RPNHiST - RPNEXP RPNHIST < RPNEXP 52 Test Statistics Wilcoxon Z -2.820
Platform A RRftHST > RPNEXP 35 Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) 0.023
60°/<f RPNHST *  RPNEXP 0 Sign Z -1.715
TOTAL 87 Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) 0.086
RPNHIST - RPNEXP RPNHIST < RPNEXP 59 Test Statistics Wilcoxon Z -4.933
Platform 8 RPNHIST > RPNEXP 25 Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) 0.000
71*4 RPNHIST* RPNEXP 3 Sign Z -3.601
TOTAL 87 Asymp. Sig (24ailed) 0.000
RPNHIST - RPNEXP RPNHIST < RPNEXP 55 Test Statistics Wilcoxon Z -4.362
Platform C RPNHIST > RPNEXP 22 Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) 0.000
74*4 RPNHiST* RPNEXP 6 Sign Z ■3.785
TOTAL 82 Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) 0.000
RPNHIST - RPNEXP RPNHIST < RPNEXP 58 Test Statistics Wilcoxon Z -5.456
Platform 0 RPNHIST > RPNEXP 14 Asymp. Sig (24ailed) 0.000
82°/<j RPNHIST* RPNEXP 5 Sign Z -5.068
TOTAL 77 Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) 0.000
Table 8, Summary o f Nonparametric Statistical Test, Platforms A-D.
Observations
It is noted that the Expert RPN was equal too or exceeded the Historical RPN comparative 
60% of the time in Platform A, 71% of the time in Platform B, 74% o f the time in Platform C, 
and 82% of the time in Platform D. While the percentages are not very high, the significance 
of the differences do indicate that the RPNE is greater than or equal to the RPNH on both the 
Wilcoxon and Sign tests. Consequently the analysis supports hypothesis 1 made in the 
research. However, further review of the data was deemed necessary to explain the lack of the 
expert RPN exceeding the Historical RPN by a larger percentage.
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Comparison of Factors in R PN  M odel
Initially, the each component o f the Expert RPN was compared to the corresponding 
comparative Historical RPN component to test hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. The comparisons for 
each platform are presented graphically for comparison in figures 18 through 29.
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Observations o f Results
It was initially apparent that while two components (severity and reparability) (example figures 
18-21 and 26-29, respectively) tend to trend comparably with the historical data values in the 
four platforms, the experts were inconsistent with the historical data on the occurrence o f the 
failures (figures 22-25).
Hypotheses 5, 6 and 7 were tested to determine if a factor or factors exist that contribute to 
resulting RPN in a greater proportion. The graphical comparisons o f the expert versus the 
historical comparative are presented in figures 30-41.
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It was observed that two o f the three components in the model exerted greater influence over 
the resultant outcome o f the model (occurrence and reparability). A Dot-Matrix plot o f the 
two factors Figure 42 show how the data points for the combination of the two variables 
produces a more identifiable relationship to the resultant RPN in the historical model. While 
not as defined in the expert model it is still visibly apparent as figure 43 shows.
SxO H SxR H RxO H
F igu ie 42, D o t  m atrix  p lo t o f  tw o -fac to r p ro d u c t co m p ared  to  th ree- 
fac to r R P N  M odel using  H isto rica l D ata.





RxOE SxRE SxO E
Figure 43, Dot matrix plot o f  two-factor product compared to three- 
factor RPN Model using Expert Data.
The overall system configuration supports this correlation as redundancy inherent in the 
system is used to minimize the severity o f component failure impacting the ability o f the 
system to support the mission of the metasystem.
By performing a best subsets regression o f the factors yields the following concurrence to the 
graphical display o f the dot-matrix plot o f the data.
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S c R 
e c e 
v r p
Vars R-Sq R-Sq(adj) C-p S H H H
1 64.2 63.8 117 . 9 14.054 X
1 21.8 20.9 355.7 20.767 X
*2 79.3 78.8 35.1 10.748 X X
2 67 .3 66 . 5 102.6 13.515 X X
3 85 .2 84 . 7 4 . 0 9.1409 X X X
Best Subsets Regression: RPNE versus SevE, OccrE, RepE
Response is RPNE
0
S c R 
e c e 
v r p
Vars R-Sq R-Sq(adj) C-p S E E E
1 54 .5 53 .9 282.7 16 .349 X
1 34 .3 33.5 444 . 9 19.641 X
*2 80.7 80.2 74 . 0 10.707 X X
2 63 .8 62 . 9 209 .9 14.667 X X
3 89.7 89.3 4.0 7.8817 X X X
This was confirmed through a regression analysis and the resulting Pearson product moment 
coefficient o f correlation (r) and the resulting coefficient of determination (r2).
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Regression Analysis: RPNH versus RxO H
The regression equation is 
RPNH = - 5.03 + 3.33 RxO H
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P
Constant -5 .0337 0 .9400 -5.35 0.000
RxO H 3. 33065 0.09073 36 . 71 0 . 000
S = 5.722 R-Sq = 94.1% R- Sq(adj) = 94.0%
PRESS = 3036.19 R-Sq(pred) = 93 .53%
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F P
Regression 1 44118 44118 1347 .65 0.000
Residual Error 85 2783 33
Lack of Fit 14 1607 115 6 .93 0.000
Pure Error 71 1176 17
Total 86 46901
Regression Analysis: RPNE versus RxO E
The regression equation is 
RPNE = - 4.30 + 3.68 RxO E
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P
Constant 4 .295 1.673 -2.57 0 . 012
RxO E 3 .6773 0.1372 26.79 0.000
S = 7.884 R-Sq = 89.4% R-Sq(adj) = 89.3%
PRESS = 5596.52 R-Sq(pred) = 88.79%
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F P
Regression 1 44620 44620 717.91 0.000
Residual Error 85 5283 62
Lack of Fit 14 1352 97 1. 74 0.066
Pure Error 71 3931 55
Total 86 49902
Observations o f Results
In comparing the two regression equations, it is noted that the slopes o f the lines are different 
with the slope o f the expert line being slightly steeper.
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Chapter Summary
It is important to note that the expert RPN trended similarly to the historical RPN. This 
provides support for the acceptance o f the expert’s ability to forecast the systems behavior 
similarly to the use o f the historical data. Comparison o f the data graphically and through the 
use of both parametric and nonparametric statistical methods showed that the experts were 
similar in the trend o f scoring the RPN variables with a tendency to score the severity and 
reparability variables higher than the variables equivalent developed from the historical data. 
This yielded higher RPNs. The experts were not as consistent with the occurrence factor in 
RPN model.
Through regression analysis and graphical comparison, it was also discovered that for the 
platforms understudy, occurrence and reparability were predominate factors in determining the 
RPN in the expert model, the historical comparative, and across all four platforms
investigated.
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DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Introduction
In the initial observation o f the RPN components, it was also noted that there was little 
consistency or trend correlation to the occurrence factor between the experts and the historical 
data (Figure 44). This chapter will attempt to explain observed variations in the model and 
propose alternate theories for investigation.
Figure 4 4 , C o m parison  O ccu rren ce  E  and  O ccurrence  H  — P la tfo rm  A.
Development of RPN-Adjusted
In looking at the difference between the expert and historical, the concept o f complementarity 
\ as it applies to complex systems seems to be in evidence. "Any
\  two different perspectives (or models) about a system will reveal 
truths about that system that are neither entirely independent nor 
entirely compatible" (Clemson, 1984). A better explanation was
Figure 45, T he Paradoxical C ube.
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A t  first you may see the tipper most square in front, as i f  you were looking up at the cube. But i f  you 
take a second glance, you may find that you are suddenly looking down at the cube, and the bottom 
most square appears to pop out closest to you. A s  the observer, you have the choice of how you will 
observe the cube. It is your act of observation that resolves the paradox. In its abstractform, both the 
upper and lower squares of the illustration are, so to speak, in front at the same time or in the rear at 
the same time. But in viewing the illustration as a cube, you the observer create the experience of this 
tow dimensional form having rear and front faces. Your act of observing creates the picture in your 
mind that it is a cube. It is only a paradoxical cube when we, observers conditioned to think that 
everything we see must be solid, insist that “it” is a solid cube. Then the cube appears tojump from one 
perspective to another, seemingly playing tricks on us.
The experts are preconditioned due to recent experiences with the systems under study that 
their perspective is shifted to the more recent occurrences. Checkland (1999) refers to this 
phenomenon as the viewpoint o f the observer. The experts due to their proximity to the 
system are unable to look past the recent time frame to yield an accurate opinion of the 5-year 
period o f actual occurrence.
As occurrence is a predominate factor in computing the RPN, as previously shown, an 
adjusted RPN (RPNadj) was developed using the historical occurrence data, and the expert 
severity and reparability data and then compared to the RPNH. This was necessitated to 
compensate for the narrow view of the experts on the occurrence component of the model. 
The resultant graphs are shown as figures 46-49.
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Best Subsets Regression: RPNadj versus SevE, RepE, OccrH
Response is RPNadj
0
S R c  
e e c 
v p r
Vars R-Sq R-Sq(adj) C-p S E E H
1 52.2 51.7 278 .3 19.011 X
1 36.1 35.3 400 .6 21.994 X
*2 87.5 87.2 13 .5 9.7799 X X
2 55.6 54.6 254 .8 18.437 X X
3 89.0 88.6 4.0 9.2208 X X X
Regression Analysis: RPNadj versus RXO-A
The regression equation is
RPNadj = - 0.750 + 3 .36 RXO-A
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P
Constant -0 .7505 0.6143 -1.22 0.223
RXO-A 3 .36161 0.04775 70 .40 0.000
S = 7.016 R-Sq = 93.4% R-Sq(adj) ■
PRESS = 17676.9 R-Sq(pred) = 93.23%
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F
Regression 1 243947 243947 4956.33
Residual Error 352 17325 49
Lack of Fit 13 6063 466 14.04




3 . 0 0 0
3.000
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Summary
Comparison o f the RPNH to the RPNadj yielded an improved test of the initial hypothesis 
where in that the adjusted RPN scores were equal to or exceeded the historical RPN 68% of 
the time in Platform A, 85% of the time in Platform B, 76% of the time in Platform C, and 
83% of the time in Platform D. in 82% of the cases modeled. SPSS outputs for testing 
RPNadj and RPNH are located in Appendix C and are summarized here in Table 9.
"Summary Table Nonparametric Statistical Test
RPNHIST - RPNadj RPNH IS 7 < RPNadj 57
Platform A RPNHIST > RPNadj 28
(60%) 68% RPNHIST = RPNadj 2
8% increase TOTAL 87
RPNHIST - RPNadj RPNHIST < RPNadj 62
Platform B RPNHIST > RPNadj 13
(71%) 85% RPNHIST = RPNadj 12
14% increase TOTAL 87
RPNHIST - RPNadj RPNHIST < RPNadj 57
Platform C RPNHIST > RPNadj 20
(74%) 76% RPNHIST = RPNadj 5
2% increase TOTAL 82
RPNHIST - RPNadj RPNHIST < RPNadj 62
Platform D RPNHIST > RPNadj 13
(82%) 83% RPNHIST = RPNadj 2
1% increase TOTAL 77
T able 9, Sum m ary o f  N o n p aram etric  Statistical T est, R P N ad j P la tfo rm s A -D .
For consistency, a best subset regression was preformed on the adjusted model showed the
relationship o f reparability and occurrence held as the dominating factors in the three-factor
RPN model and is included in Appendix D.
The use of the adjusted RPN showed a marked similarity in shape to that o f the historical 
RPN over that o f the o rig in a l  expert RPN. While the increases in the nonparametric statistical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
126
test were minimal for Platforms C and D, visual comparison of the graphs show greater trend 
similarity with the historical RPN and the adjusted RPN than with the expert RPN.
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This chapter discusses the conclusions drawn from the research. Recommendations for further 
research on complex systems using high-level FMEA, as a basis for development of a holistic 
perspective on the behavior, are also discussed.
Conclusions
This research tested hypotheses focusing on the ability of experts to develop risk priority 
numbers consistent with the historical data on a legacy system. The results o f the research 
extend the scholarly literature by developing a new use for FMEA, commonly used in research 
and design, and expanding it as a tool that allows for a targeted assessment of system 
components when compared to historical failure and repair data. Use of the expert provides 
for a more holistic approach to modeling of the system under study than that of historical data, 
as the experts may have greater insight into the ability of the current personnel to repair and 
maintain the equipment.
The initial research question posed in the dissertation was, “can a methodology that uses the 
expert knowledge, elicited from system experts through a high level FMEA, be used to create a 
knowledge based decision support system to aid in the assessment o f legacy systems?”
Consistent trending of the expert RPN and the proposed adjusted RPN indicate that the 
expert behavioral model is consistent with the historical behavior o f the systems under study.
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It can also be noted that the expert tended to evaluate the factors o f repair and severity at 
higher levels than the historical data indicated. This could indicate that the expert has a more 
holistic view of the system as it relates to the much larger system and group of systems that 
comprise the ship thus more accurately reflecting the effects o f the system under study on the 
ships mission availability.
Conversely, the experts due to their proximity to the system are unable to look past the recent 
time frame to yield an accurate opinion of the 5-year period of actual occurrence. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, it became apparent to the researcher that the experts lacked the 
capacity to recall the failures occurring over a 5-year period. With the concept of 
complementary, it became insightful that the perspective o f the expert was clouded by recent 
events that could be easily recalled. As the historical data used to provide the actual failures 
for the past five years was readily available, the RPN adjusted was developed and presented as 
a means to overcome this obstacle in future research.
As expected the experts resultant RPN, and the RPN adjusted, was greater than or equal to the 
RPN developed from historical data relating to the actual system behavior in the majority of 
the failures investigated. This indicates a propensity, as stated in the first hypothesis, that the 
experts will be more holistic in their assignment o f the variables. Other conclusions from 
analysis of the data are as follows:
1. System design has influence over the outcome o f the RPN.
In the system studied for this research, initial design o f the system provided redundant 
components that mitigated the severity o f the component failure in regards to system
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behavior and response to component failure. As a result o f this design, severity of 
component failure exerted less influence than the other variables in the model. Design 
for ease of repair and robust system designs would intuitively yield reductions in the 
resultant RPN as well.
2. Reparability o f the system is a function o f the complex interaction o f the personnel 
with the system and has a tendency to exert influence over the outcome of the RPN 
model.
Analysis o f the historical data regarding repair and the expert’s opinion were, while 
similar, often differing. The experts tended to score reparability o f the system at 
higher levels due to their belief that the personnel lacked the necessary skills required 
in the performance of the tasks necessary to repair the system. It is the expert’s 
evaluation of the personnel ability that gives depth and perspective (a more holistic 
view) to the model that cannot be captured from the historical data
3. The characteristics of complex systems, i.e. complementarity, self-organization and 
system darkness, have a profound effect on the ability to model system behavior.
The experts are human beings that have had a great deal o f interaction with the system; 
as such, it is their experience with the system under study that a holistic perspective is 
trying to incorporate. The complex system and any representation o f the complex 
system can only be described by what is known, observed or suspected. Unknown, 
unobserved, unrepresentative, and emergent characteristics will be present System 
behavior and informal structure emerge only through system operation, regardless of
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the detailed design efforts conducted prior to system deployment In the legacy system 
it is even more apparent because the system has been deployed for a great length of 
time. In order to capture these aspects and quantify them for use in development of 
management decisions, it is paramount to cast a wide net through the use o f experts 
on the system to gamer the vantage point or frame of reference when viewing the 
system that reveals the most knowledge about the system in it current operational 
state.
Recommendations
Maintenance productivity is a critical element o f Engineering Management and Systems 
Engineering. A significant issue in developing and implementing productive maintenance 
systems involves development and analysis of data that can direct changes and identify high 
priority areas. This research supports a systemic approach to predictive maintenance 
programs. This approach employs a modified form of Failure Mode Effects Analysis with a 
Risk Priority System ranking system that employs expert judgment. While this fills a critical 
gap in the literature, it leads to the following recommendations for future research in this area:
1. Similar research should be done on a variety of systems to map the resulting Expert 
RPN against the Historical data. While the research looked at single system on 
multiple platforms, it is believed that based on initial system design, variables in the 
RPN model may have changing predominance in the outcome o f the resultant RPN.
2. While current FMEA looks at three factors in development o f the RPN, it is suggested 
that this or a similar study look at the addition o f a fourth variable — cost While it may 
be construed as a factor looked upon in modeling severity and reparability, using cost
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as an additional factor may have benefit in looking at the system model in a more 
holistic manner.
3. Use o f different means to elicit the expert opinion (other than the Delphi method used 
in this research) might result in differing results to the expert model. Testing the 
elicitation techniques against each other may provide greater insight into the best way 
to extract the knowledge held by the experts in this field.
4. Using the historical model as a test basis, disparity in the two models may be used to 
target resources for improvement in the system. This would allow for the targeted 
deployment o f resources and time when dealing with a legacy system that is cosdy to 
assess.
Failure Mode Effects Analysis is a useful tool in research and design, by adapting the model 
slightly it appears to be even more useful in evaluation o f legacy systems. Prediction of 
problems before they occur can minimize system downtime and lead to targeted proactive 
maintenance planning. The methodology offered in the research provides a framework for the 
use of experts to provide engineering managers a more holistic perspective of a legacy system 
when making maintenance assessments.
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A p p e n d i x  A












Figure A-1: Example of Fault Tree System Diagram 
Note: Fault tree may begin with components as shown here and may evolve to functional breakdown. For example, the 
compressor in the left column may contain “oil system" and include the pump and cooler.
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Table A-l: FMEA Worksheet Example





omoressor Sub component: Piston and connectina rod 
FII date: Prepared bv:































problems in 3-M 
or ICAS for this 
compressor
8 Cannot be 
repaired by 
ship's crew , 
significant part 
issues.
48 ICAS and 3-M 




6 1 8 48
Oil pump 
failure
6 System down 
overhaul needed
5 Pump and switch 
must both be bad 
for failure.










Level 2 for 
system
6 3 8 144
Clogged oil 
filter.
6 5 Flow switch must 
fail to damage 
compressor
8 240 Level 2 -  
replace all 
sensors
6 3 8 144
Ring failure Oil pump 
failure
Interpretation: Based on FMEA, summary recommendation may be for Level 2 maintenance since no indicators show that 












TABLE A-2 SEVERITY RATING FOR FMEA
Consider these criteria when selecting the failure severity impact rating
Effect Rank System Description Mission Impact CASREP potential
No effect 1 Required for overall integrity of other than essential or backup system. No effect to personnel, 
ship, or mission
None
Very slight 2 Required for overall integrity of other than essential or backup system. Very slight effect to 
personnel, ship, or 
mission
Minimal possibility of C-2.
Slight 3 Required for efficient performance of ship’s mission, or 
Important safety or damage control item, or
Required for overall integrity of equipment or systems that are not essential, but are required 
as backups in case of primary system failure.
Slight effect to personnel, 
ship, or mission
Possible C-2 (25% or less)
Minor 4 Required for efficient performance of ship’s mission, or 
Important safety or damage control item, or
Required for overall integrity of equipment or systems that are not essential, but are required 
as backups in case of primary system failure.
Minor effect to personnel, 
ship, or mission
Normally C-2 in at least 50% of 
cases
Moderate 5 Required for efficient performance of ship’s mission, or 
Important safety or damage control item, or
Required for overall integrity of equipment or systems that are not essential, but are required 
as backups in case of primary system failure.
Moderate effect to 
personnel, ship, or 
mission,
Usually C-2 in at least 75% of 
cases, chance of G-3 CASREP is 
10% or less
Significant 6 Required to sustain performance of ship’s mission, orExtremely important safety or damage 
control item, orRequired to maintain overall integrity of ship or a system essential to ship’s 
mission.
Significant effect to 
personnel, ship, or 
mission,
Possible C-3 in at least 25% of 
cases
Major 7 Required to sustain performance of ship's mission, or 
Extremely important safety or damage control item, or
Required to maintain overall integrity of ship or a system essential to ship’s mission,.
Major effect to personnel, 
ship, or mission
Likely C-3 (over 50% of cases), 
C-4 is possible (less than 10% of 
cases)
Serious 8 Required to sustain performance of ship’s mission, or 
Extremely important safety or damage control item, or
Required to maintain overall integrity of ship or a system essential to ship’s mission.
Serious effect to 
personnel, ship, or 
mission,
Definite C-3. C-4 possible in 
50% or less of cases
Extreme 
(with warning)
9 Required for performance of ship’s mission, or Critical safety or damage control issue. Extreme effect to 
personnel, ship, or 
mission.




10 Required for performance of ship’s mission, or 
Critical safety or damage control issue.
Hazardous effect to 
personnel, ship, or 
mission.













Table A-3 FMEA Occurrence Guidelines
Rate the probability of failure occurrence over the next 12 months of operation considering the current state of the system 
_________________________________ including ICAS monitoring and 3M data.________________ _________________
Occurrence Rank Estimated 
MTTF (hours)
Probability of 
failure in 8,500 
hours (12 months)
Detection / Sensor Criteria Typical Occurrence 
Description
Almost never 1 MTTF> 100,000 P (failure) -  1% Current controls / detectors, or maintenance 
information / procedures almost always detect the 
failure. Reliable detection controls are known and 
used in similar processes. Audible alarm cannot be 
ignored. ICAS monitors and alarms this failure so it 
does not occur.
Failure is extremely unlikely, 
history shows no reason for 
failure prediction.
Remote 2 MTTF- 100,000 P (failure) -  5% Very high likelihood current controls, detectors and / 
or maintenance procedures will detect the failure.
Failures very rare.
Very slight 3 MTTF- 75,000 P (failure) -10%, High likelihood current controls, detectors and / or 
maintenance procedures will detect the failure.
Failures occur infrequently.
Slight 4 MTTF -  40,000 P (failure) -  25%, Moderately high likelihood current controls, detectors 
and / or maintenance procedures will detect the 
failure.
Failures occur occasionally.
Low 5 MTTF -  25,000 P (failure) -  40%, Medium likelihood current controls, detectors and / or 
maintenance procedures will detect the failure.
Failures occur with 
moderate frequency
Medium 6 MTTF -  10,000 P (failure) -  60%, Low likelihood current controls, detectors and / or 
maintenance procedures will detect the failure.




7 MTTF -  5,000 P (failure) -  75%, Slight likelihood current controls, detectors and / or 
maintenance procedures will detect the failure.
System fails often.
High 8 MTTF -  3,000 P(failure) -  90%, Very slight likelihood current controls, detectors and / 
or maintenance procedures will detect the failure.
Failures will occur in the 
large majority of cases
Very High 9 MTTF -  2,000 P(failure) -  95%, Remote likelihood current controls, detectors and / or 
maintenance procedures will detect the failure.
Very high failure rate.
Almost
Certain
10 MTTF -  1,000 P(failure) -  99%, No known controls, detection or maintenance 
procedure available to detect failure
Failure almost certain.
Resolution: If actual numerical value falls between two values -  always select the higher value. If the team has a disagreement in the ranking, use the 
following approach:
•  If adjacent categories, average the difference. For example, one member says 5 and one member says 6, the ranking would be 5.5. If the 
disagreement is more than one category, consensus must be reached -  even with one holdout. This indicates a serious difference in severity. Do not use 












Table A-4 FMEA Remediation Guidelines
Rate the probability of remediating the failure based on whether it can be detected, mitigated, and / or prevented by maintenance 
actions, controls, inspections, or maintenance information (ICASE). Low - ranked failure modes are not productive areas for
SEMAT II activity.
Detection Rank Probability of 
Detection
Repair context Parts availability Deployment Repair Summary
Almost
certain
1 P (remediation) > 
99%
Easily repairable by ship's force 99% or more Parts readily available without delays 99% 
or more
Failure easily repaired in all cases
Very High 2 P (remediation) ~ 
95%
Repairable by ship’s force in at least 95% of 
cases
Parts readily available, delays seldom 
occur very infrequently
Failure easily repaired in essentially all cases
High 3 P (remediation) ~ 
90%
Normally repairable by ship’s force in at least 
90% of cases
Parts normally available, delays seldom 
occur
Failure easily repaired in many cases
Moderately
High
4 P (remediation) ~ 
75%
Often repairable by ship’s force in at least 
75% of cases.
Parts normally available with minor delays Failure usually repaired without problems in most 
cases
Medium 5 P (remediation) ~ 
60%
Usually repairable by ship’s force (in about 
60% of cases) and 10% require FTA support
Parts usually available Failure usually repaired but problems do occur in 
some cases.
Low 6 P (remediation) ~ 
40%
Occasionally repairable by ship’s force (in 
10% of cases) and at least 25% requiring 
FTA.
Parts occasionally available Failure often repaired but significant logistics 
effort required in many cases
Slight 7 P (remediation) ~ 
25%
Seldom repaired by ship’s force (less than a 
5%) and often requiring FTA in 50% or more 
cases,
Parts seldom available and may require 
long lead time
Failure is repairable but requires major logistics 
effort in most cases
Very slight 8 P (remediation) ~ 
10%
Unlikely repair by ships forces, usually FTA to 
accomplish repairs in at least 75% of cases
Parts require long lead time Failure is usually repairable but with significant 
logistics support problems.
Remote 9 P (remediation) ~ 
5%
Not repairable by ships forces, always 
requires FTA to accomplish repairs
Parts not available and long lead required Failure is not repairable without major logistic 
effort in essentially all cases
Almost
Impossible
10 P (remediation) < 
1%
Not repairable by ships forces, always 
requires FTA to accomplish repairs
Parts not available and long lead required Failure is not repairable without major logistic 
effort in essentially all cases
Resolution: If actual numerical value falls between two values -  always select the higher value. If the team has a disagreement in the ranking, use the 
following approach: If adjacent categories, average the difference. For example, one member says 5 and one member says 6, the ranking would be 5.5. If 
the disagreement is more than one category, consensus must be reached -  even with one holdout. This indicates a serious difference in severity. Do not 
use average or majority. Team may not agree 100% but able to “live with it.” Everyone must have ownership.
147
Appendix B
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
148


















For general purposes, it will be assumed that LP Air 
system is comprised as indicated with a rotary helical 
screw type compressor.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
150
System ^  Boundary
Input To All Components
There are no 
dehydrators in 

























































3. Fresh water (FW)pump 
(Reciprocating)
FW heat exchanger 
FW surge tank (Recip.) 
Intercoolers (Reciprocatimg)
8. Aftercoolers (Reciprocating)
11. Diaphragm control valve
















3. Diaphragm control valves 
(Seawater)
4. Thermostatic control 
valves (Fresh water)





2. Various component 
casings and housings
3. Miscellaneous valves
4. Various gaskets & seals
1. First stage discharge high air 
temperature switch
2. Second stage discharge high 
air temperature switch
3. First stage high condensate 
level shutdown switch/probe
4. Second stage high condensate 
level shutdown switch/probe
5. Low oil pressure shutdown
6. Condensate drain timer 
relays

















7. Inlet filter /silencer
Sensing
1. Various sensors
- Air discharge pressure
- Heat exchanger pressure 
differential
- Oil pressure
- Crankcase oil temp
- High FW cooling water 
temp
- Sea water discharge temp
- High air temperature
- Cooling FW supply temp
- Sea water inlet temperature












Cylinder liner - Guide (MP only) 










Cylinder Unloaders (LP only) 
Drain Trap
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NPar Tests Platform A
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
RPNHIST - RPNEXP Negative Ranks 52a 47.17 2453.00
Positive Ranks 35b 39.29 1375.00
Ties 0C
Total 87
a. RPNHIST < RPNEXP
b. RPNHIST > RPNEXP 








a. Based on positive ranks.








a. RPNHIST < RPNEXP
b. RPNHIST > RPNEXP










Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
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Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
RPNADJ - RPNHIST Negative Ranks 28a 41.18 1153.00
Positive Ranks 57b 43.89 2502.00
Ties 2C
Total 87
a. RPNADJ < RPNHIST
b. RPNADJ > RPNHIST








a. Based on negative ranks.








a- RPNADJ < RPNHIST
b. RPNADJ > RPNHIST 
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NPar Tests Platform B
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
RPNHIST - RPNEXP Negative Ranks 59® 49.00 2891.00
Positive Ranks 25b 27.16 679.00
Ties 3C
Total 87
a. RPNHIST < RPNEXP
b. RPNHIST > RPNEXP 








a. Based on positive ranks, 








a. RPNHIST < RPNEXP
b. RPNHIST > RPNEXP










Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
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Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
RPNADJ - RPNH Negative Ranks 13a 32.58 423.50
Positive Ranks 62b 39.14 2426.50
Ties 2C
Total 77
a. RPNADJ < RPNH 
b- RPNADJ > RPNH 








a. Based on negative ranks.








a- RPNADJ < RPNH
b. RPNADJ > RPNH 
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NPar Tests Platform C
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
RPNH - RPNE Negative Ranks 55a 41.92 2305.50
Positive Ranks 21b 29.55 620.50
Ties 6°
Total 82
a. RPNH < RPNE
b. RPNH > RPNE








a- Based on positive ranks, 








a- RPNH < RPNE
b. RPNH > RPNE 










Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
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Ranks
N Mean Sum of
RPNADJ- Negative 20 a 41.18 1153.0













a. Based on negative ranks.








a. RPNADJ < RPNHIST 
b- RPNADJ > RPNHIST
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NPar Tests Platform D
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
RPNH - RPNE Negative Ranks 58a 39.41 2286.00
Positive Ranks 14b 24.43 342.00
Ties 5C
Total 77
a- RPNH < RPNE
b. RPNH > RPNE








a. Based on positive ranks.








a- RPNH < RPNE
b. RPNH > RPNE










Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
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Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
RPNADJ - RPNH Negative Ranks 13a 32.58 423.50
Positive Ranks 62b 39.14 2426.50
Ties 2C
Total 77
a- RPNADJ < RPNH
b. RPNADJ > RPNH  








a. Based on negative ranks, 








a. RPNADJ < RPNH 
b- RPNADJ > RPNH
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Platform A




v c R 
e u e 
r r p 
i r a 
t e i
Vars R-Sq R-Sq(adj) n i S y n r
1 53 .4 52 .8 331.0 25.049 X
1 28.1 27.2 553 .2 31.119 X
2 86.4 86.0 43 .5 13 .628 X X
2 58.4 57 .4 288 . 9 23.810 X X
3 91.1 90.8 4.0 11.078 X X X
Regression Analysis: RPN versus RXO-E
The regression equation is 
RPN = - 4.31 + 5.67 RXO-E
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P
Constant -4.305 1.737 -2.48 0.015
RXO-E 5.6663 0.1398 40.54 0.000
S = 7.907 R-Sq = 95.4% R-Sq(adj) = 95.3%
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F P
Regression 1 102730 102730 1643.12 0.000
Residual Error 80 5002 63
Total 81 107732
Regression Analysis: RPNadj versus RXO-A
The regression equation is 
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Platform B







' S R-Sq R-Sq ( a d j ) C-p S E E E
1 54.5 53 . 9 282 .7 16.349 X
1 34.3 33.5 444 . 9 19.641 X
2 80.7 80.2 74 . 0 10.707 X X
2 63.8 62.9 209.9 14.667 X X
3 89.7 89.3 4.0 7.8817 X X X
Regression Analysis: RPN E versus RxO E
The regression equation is 
RPNE = - 4.30 + 3.68 RxO E
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P
Constant -4.295 1.673 -2 . 57 0 . 012
RxO E 3 .6773 0.1372 26 . 79 0.000
S = 7.884 R-Sq = 89.4% R-■Sq(adj) = 89.
PRESS = 5596.52 R-Sq(pred) = 88.79%
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F
Regression 1 44620 44620 717.91 0
Residual Error 85 5283 62
Lack of Fit 14 1352 97 1.74 0
Pure Error 71 3931 55
Total 86 49902




The regression equation is
RPNadj = - 0.750 + 3. 36 RXO-A
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P
Constant 0.7505 0.6143 -1.22 0.223
RXO-A 3 .36161 0.04775 70.40 0 .000
S = 7.016 R-Sq = 93.4% R-■Sq(adj) = 93 .
PRESS = 17676.9 R-Sq(pred) = 93 .23%
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F
Regression 1 243947 243947 4956 .33 0
Residual Error 352 17325 49
Lack of Fit 13 6063 466 14 . 04 0
Pure Error 339 11262 33
Total 353 261272
 . 066
 . 0 0 0
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Platform C




v c R 
e u e 
r r p 
i r a 
t e i
:s R-Sq R-Sq(adj) C-p S y n r
1 55 . 7 55.2 268.1 16 . 021 X
1 33.5 32 . 7 443 . 8 19.625 X
2 80 . 7 80.3 71.6 10 .627 X X
2 64.0 63.2 204 .1 14 .523 X X
3 89.5 89.1 4.0 7.8834 X X X
Regression Analysis: RPN versus RXO-E
The regression equation is 
RPN = - 4.29 + 3.66 RXO-E
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P
Constant -4.294 1.661 -2.59 0.011
RXO-E 3.6629 0.1367 26.80 0.000
S = 7.830 R-Sq = 89.4% R-Sq(adj) = 89.3%
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F
Regression 1 44031 44031 718.14
Residual Error 85 5212 61
Total 86 49242
Regression Analysis: RPNadj versus RXO-A
The regression equation is 














0 . 143 
0 . 0 0 0















0 . 0 0 0
P
0 . 0 0 0
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Piatfotm D




v c R 
e u e 
r r p 
i r a 
t e i
rs R-Sq R-Sq(adj) 0 1̂ 0 S y n r
1 54.4 53 .8 296.6 25.345 X
1 27.3 26.4 516.6 32.011 X
2 86.3 85.9 40.5 14.015 X X
2 59 .4 58 .3 258 . 7 24.100 X X
3 91.0 90 . 6 4 . 0 11.417 X X X
Regression Analysis: RPN versus RXO-E
The regression equation is 
RPN = - 4.26 + 5.67 RXO-E
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P
Constant -4.261 1.828 -2.33 0.022
RXO-E 5.6732 0.1453 39.04 0.000
S = 8.132 R-Sq = 95.3% R-Sq(adj) = 95.2%
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F
Regression 1 100807 100807 1524.45
Residual Error 75 4960 66
Total 76 105767
Regression Analysis: RPNadj versus RXO-A
The regression equation is 
RPNadj = 6.03 + 2.41 RXO-A
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P
Constant 6.026 2.425 2.48 0.015
RXO-A 2.4135 0.1633 14.78 0.000
S = 14.92 R-Sq = 74.4% R-Sq(adj) = 74.1%
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F
Regression 1 48642 48642 218.39
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Compiling the Historical Data for Comparison
Development of the Historical Data used to create a Historical RPN Comparative was 
developed through the COMNAVSURJFLANT effort. The results of the development o f the 
Historical Data for the LP-MPAC are synopsized from internal COMNAVSURFLANT 
documents (LP-MP Failure Mode Report, August 2002). Information from that report appears 
here in abridged form for research consistency and military classification purposes.
Using the Open Architecture Retrieval System (OARS), the Data Analyst performed a search 
query to extract maintenance actions (OPNAV 479Q/2Ks) for the past 5 years.

















OARS allows for the extraction and manipulation of the 
data in the Ships 3-M system.
Figure 11, M aintenance D a ta  F low
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The database selected was Ship’s 3-M and the standard reports used were ADO 15 (All 
Maintenance Actions Plus Narrative) and AD08 (Maintenance Issues). Due to the varied 
nature o f reporting maintenance data on LP and MP compressed air plants, it was necessary 
to cast a wide net to ensure all data was captured. Search queries were performed not only 
on SWLINs 55152 and 55153 (Compressors, MP air and LP air respectively), but also on 
SWLINs 55120 and 55121 (Air system, LP and MP). Table 7 displays the fields and entries 
used to perform these search queries. In the table, “H” is the TYCOM code for 
COMNAVSURFLANT. Both open and close ESWBS records were queried due to ESWBS 
usually resident on at least one o f them.
Table 7, Search Query Fields (3-M OARS) Search Fields
Expression 1 Operator Expression 2 Logical Operand





(ESWBS_OPENING — 55153 OR
ESWBS_CLOSIN G ~ 55153 OR
ESWBS_OPENING — 55121 OR
ESWBS_CLOSING 55121 OR
ESWBS_OPENING — 55152 OR
ESWBS_CLOSIN G — 55152 OR
ESWBS_OPENING = 55120 OR
ESWBS_CLOSING = 55120)
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The result was all 3-M maintenance data associated with COMNAVSURFLANT LP/M P air 
compressors, which included some items not within the study boundaries. To refine the 
data, a word search query was accomplished to isolate only those maintenance actions o f 
interest within the original data download. The following 95 key words (associated with low 
and medium air plants) were used in varied combinations to further electronically isolate the 
data o f interest for the study:















15. Cooling Water System 
(Including Coolers)
16. Dehydrator
17. Dehydrator (Refrig. Type)
18. Drain Trap
19. Expansion Tank
20. Filter (Air) & Breather
21. Filter/Strainer (Injection 
water)
22. Filter (Lube Oil)
23. Flow Switch
24. Float Switch
25. Float switch (Condensate)





31. Gauge (Hour - Run Meter)
32. Gauge (Pressure)
33. Gauge (Temperature)
34. Gauge (Inj. Water Pressure)
35. Hose
36. Heat Exchanger (Fresh/SW)
37. Head Gasket










48. Pressure Switch (Air)
49. Pressure Switch (Oil)
50. Pressure Switch (Injection 
water)
51. Pump
















68. Temperature Switch (Air)
69. Temperature Switch (Dew 
Pt)




74. Salt Water System Cooling 
Valves
75. Valve Assembly (LP 
Discharge)
76. Valve (Receiver Drain)
77. FW Fill Valve





82. Valve Assembly (LP 
Suction)
83. Valve (Solenoid, 
Condensate Dm)
84. Valve (Solenoid tank Drain)
85. Valve (Solenoid Injection)
86. Valve (Solenoid Valve 
relay)
87. Unloader Valve Solenoid
88. Valve (SW Diaphragm 
control)
89. Valve (Thermostat 
Controlled)
90. Valve (Unloader)
91. Valve (Water Regulating)
92. Wiper Box
93. Water Lube Oil
94. Crosshead
95. Zinc Anodes
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The 3-M OARS download and electronic sorting resulted in a total o f 12,185 maintenance 
actions for low-pressure air plants [over five years] and a total o f 2,269 maintenance actions for 
medium pressure air plants [also over five years]. The raw maintenance and cost data from 
each OPNAV 4790/2K was reviewed for applicability to ensure the components were inside 
the system study boundaries.
For purposes o f analysis, it became necessary to specify which components were part of the 
“compressor” and which were part o f supporting systems/components within the LP and MP 
Air Plant System. Failures for several miscellaneous components or consumables are 
applicable to both compressor and support equipment APLs. Therefore, for this situation, the 
gauge, filter, valve, gasket, etc., reported under an equipment/component APL was assumed to 
be part o f the equipment/component under which it was reported. However some o f these 
components have their own APL and not attributed to a specific component When this 
occurs, the component is accounted for under it’s own APL.
The data was then modeled to yield probability o f failure over 12-month period in the 
COMNAVSURFLANT effort. This data was provided for use in the historical RPN
comparative.
Additionally, the Navy has a Casualty Reporting (CASREP) system, where unit commanders 
report mission degradation o f their ships to higher-level commanders. This is a classified 
report that is retained in a database. By removing the ship names and mission specifics, 
CASREP data becomes unclassified and can be analyzed. LPAC/MPAC CASREP data was 
gathered from the Navy consolidated CASREP reporting system for analysis in the 
COMNAVSURFLANT effort.
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The vast majority o f CASREPs were C-2 level, indicating minor mission effects (mostly due to 
redundancies in design) when one LPAC/ MPAC was lost. However, the much lower 
population MPACs showed more C3/C4 CASREPs than LPACs, indicating loss of a single 
MPAC has significant mission effects in some cases. This is probably due to the lack o f an 
H.P. Air system back up in MPAC ships.
The data was then modeled to yield effect of failure on mission impact in the 
COMNAVSURFLANT effort. This data was provided for use in the historical RPN 
comparative.
The current maintenance strategies and tasks associated with low and medium pressure air 
plants were found in the MAI, ICMP and PMS and are detailed as follows:
MAI (Master Assessment Index) -  The COMNAVSURFLANT Master Assessment Index 
(MAI) - accessible via the COMNAVSURFLANT web page - lists the maintenance objects 
assessed during SEMAT. The MAI provides a list of maintenance tasks and either the next 
scheduled assessment date or the most recently completed assessment date. (As the MAI 
database matures it is expected that both dates will be provided). The SEM AT tasks 
incorporate thirteen tasks under the following ESWBSs: 55152 (Compressors, MP Air) and 
55153 (Compressors, LP Air).
ICMP —The current ICMP maintenance strategy for low and medium pressure air plant 
incorporates 13 tasks under the ESWBS 55121 (Air System, Low and Medium Pressure), 
55152 (Compressors, MP Air) and 55153 (Compressors, LP Air).
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PMS -T he PMS tasks for low and medium pressure air plants incorporates the 85 tasks under 
the following Ship Work Authorization Boundary (SWAB) number 5510 (Compressed air 
systems) 5515 (Compressors, Air)
In addition to the ICMP, PMS and MAI, the following sources were reviewed for maintenance 
requirements as they pertain to low and medium air pressure air plants: Naval Ships Technical 
Manual (NSTM), Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual (JFMM), Engineering for Reduced 
Maintenance (ERM) and Cumbersome Work Packages (CWP).
The COMNAVSURFLANT effort was able to derive a comparative nominal numeric score 
for the level o f repair necessary to repair the system in the event of failure. The data was 
provided for use in the research.
The data yielding from this filtration, verification and validation o f the data resulted in 
statistical data that, when applied to a FMEA model, produced a practical numeric comparison 
that may be used to substantiate the expert solicitation FMEA model proposed in the research.
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